Succeeding King: Ralph David Abernathy, Sclc, And The Long Civil Rights Movement by Blusiewicz, Scott
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 
2017 
Succeeding King: Ralph David Abernathy, Sclc, And The Long Civil 
Rights Movement 
Scott Blusiewicz 
University of Mississippi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd 
 Part of the History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Blusiewicz, Scott, "Succeeding King: Ralph David Abernathy, Sclc, And The Long Civil Rights Movement" 
(2017). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 635. 
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/635 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more 
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
SUCCEEDING KING: 
RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, SCLC, AND THE LONG CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis presented  
in partial fulfillment of requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts 
 in the Arch Dalrymple III Department of History 
The University of Mississippi 
 
 
 
 
By 
Scott Blusiewicz 
December 2017 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2017 by Scott Blusiewicz 
All rights reserved. 
ABSTRACT 
      As president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Martin Luther King Jr. 
emerged as America’s most prominent civil rights activist during the late 1950s and the 1960s. 
Due to his eloquent speeches and ability to organize large-scale nonviolent protests, King 
inspired numerous individuals to participate in a grassroots movement for equal rights. After 
earning two landmark victories with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, King and his SCLC colleagues shifted the focus of their work to improving 
economic opportunities for America’s poor citizens.  To combat poverty, King planned an 
ambitious protest designed to force Lyndon Johnson and the U.S. Congress to face the stark 
reality that millions of Americans remained impoverished.  Yet an assassin killed King weeks 
before the launch of his Poor People’s Campaign.  As a result, Ralph David Abernathy, King’s 
designated successor, inherited the daunting task of leading the largest direct action campaign 
since the Voting Rights March three years earlier.  In addition to directing the campaign, 
Abernathy encountered a series of unfavorable circumstances as he attempted to advance King’s 
goal of eradicating poverty by fundamentally altering America’s economic and political systems.  
These circumstances included a poor relationship with Johnson and his successor, Richard 
Nixon, internal dissension within SCLC, and increasing apathy from the American public.  
Despite these obstacles, Abernathy fought to keep SCLC and the civil rights movement alive for 
nearly a decade.  In order to understand the diminishing influence of the movement in the 1970s, 
one must examine Abernathy’s tumultuous tenure as SCLC president. 
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INTRODUCTION 
      In the frantic hours after an assassin’s bullet struck Martin Luther King Jr. on the balcony of 
Memphis’ Lorraine Motel, Ralph David Abernathy struggled to process the sudden death of his 
closest friend.  When a reporter questioned Abernathy about the details of King’s death, the co-
founder of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) failed to provide any response.  
A follow-up question prompted Abernathy to describe the details of his first encounter with King 
in Montgomery fourteen years earlier, yet he ignored the reporter’s requests for a statement on 
the riots that broke out in cities across America that evening.1
      For Abernathy, King’s sudden death brought on more than the usual feelings of grief and 
despair that accompany the loss of a dear friend.  It meant that he had to take over King’s post as 
SCLC president and guide the organization just as the focus of the civil rights movement shifted 
from legal equality to enhanced economic opportunity.  Although King recognized the need to 
implement a succession plan for the SCLC in the event of his incapacitation, planning for such a 
morbid scenario unsettled Abernathy.  In fact, when King first broached the subject more than 
three years before his assassination, Abernathy tried to talk him out of officially designating a 
successor.  When he saw that King had no intention of leaving the matter unresolved, Abernathy 
suggested Andrew Young and Jesse Jackson as worthy candidates to potentially follow King as 
SCLC president.  According to Abernathy, King valued continuity and he believed the 
organization would only stay the course if his right-hand man succeeded him.  King told 
   
                                                          
1 Taylor Branch, At Canaan’s Edge: America in the King Years 1965-68 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 767. 
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Abernathy that “you are the only person who could keep the team together.  And if the team 
stays together, then the program will come out of the team.”2
      This study begins with Abernathy’s promotion to SCLC president in 1968.  The first chapter 
examines the first ten months of Abernathy’s presidential tenure with a focus on the Poor 
People’s Campaign, the final project King planned before his death.  In the wake of the 
assassination, Abernathy decided to move forward with the campaign and SCLC launched the 
ambitious project in May.  The second chapter analyzes SCLC’s decision to assist in the 
organizing and execution of the Charleston hospital strike in the spring and early summer of 
1969.  Abernathy committed the organization to join with the local activists in Charleston after 
he received a telegram from Mary Moultrie, the leader of the dozen black female employees who 
lost their jobs at the Medical College of South Carolina (MCH) after a failed attempt to 
unionize.
  
3  The third chapter explores Abernathy’s final years as SCLC president and his 
subsequent quest for a congressional seat.  In early 1977, Abernathy resigned from the 
organization he co-founded after a twenty-year tenure as an SCLC officer.  When Jimmy Carter 
tapped Andrew Young to become America’s first African-American U.N. Ambassador, 
Abernathy entered the special election to fill Young’s vacant seat in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.4
                                                          
2 Ralph David Abernathy, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York: HarperPerennial, 1990), 475-478. 
  The chapter examines the evolution of the civil rights movement, from 
nonviolent demonstrations to the splintering of civil rights organizations and the decision made 
by many civil rights activists, including Abernathy, to resign their leadership positions with civil 
rights groups and pursue political careers. 
3 Mary Moultrie to Ralph David Abernathy and Andy Young, telegram, March 22, 1969, SCLC Papers, Box 57, Folder 
9,  Stuart A. Rose Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University. 
4 Abernathy, 584-85. 
 3 
 
      Martin Luther King Jr. serves as the focus of much of the existing scholarship on the SCLC 
and the leadership of the civil rights movement.  Historians frequently mention Ralph David 
Abernathy and two of the most prominent civil rights scholars, Taylor Branch and David J. 
Garrow, interviewed Abernathy for their multi-volume works.  Yet Abernathy remains a 
secondary figure in many monographs, perhaps due to his unwavering public support of King.  
Years after his resignation from SCLC, Abernathy acknowledged that his steadfast loyalty to 
King might have led some of his colleagues to overlook his contributions to the organization’s 
campaigns, “I’m sure it seemed to them that I was no more than an appendage to Martin, 
someone who served as a part companion, part bodyguard, but who never played an important 
role in the decisions that affected the direction of the movement.”5
      Both Branch and Garrow conclude their studies of the SCLC and the civil rights movement 
with King’s assassination.  In addition, Adam Fairclough devoted a chapter of his monograph on 
the SCLC to Abernathy’s presidency.  Fairclough argues that Abernathy’s decision to remain a 
loyal partner to King cost him the opportunity to develop his own leadership style.  As a result, 
Fairclough believes Abernathy’s efforts “to emulate King’s intellectual style” failed to resonate 
with the SCLC staff and caused the organization to founder in the early 1970s.
 
6
      Labor historians Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg have also studied Abernathy, primarily 
through a comprehensive analysis of the Charleston hospital workers’ strike.  Fink and 
Greenberg devoted a chapter to the strike in their 1989 monograph on Local 1199, the national 
hospital workers’ union.  The authors illuminate the goals of Local 1199, the SCLC, the strike’s 
participants, and Charleston’s African American residents concluding that, while a clear victory 
 
                                                          
5 Abernathy, 478 
6 Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin 
Luther King Jr. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 389. 
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eluded all three groups, each constituency achieved notable gains as a result of the strike.7  Other 
historians, such as, Christopher P. Lehman, described the strike as a victory for the SCLC while 
scholar Steve Estes posits that the strike resulted in financial and political empowerment for the 
city’s black residents.8
      Gerald D. McKnight’s 1998 book remains the definitive monograph on the Poor People’s 
Campaign.  McKnight argues that the failure of the campaign does not rest solely with 
Abernathy and the SCLC.  Although he acknowledges that the SCLC’s leaders botched any 
chance at generating goodwill from the media and the American public due to the 
mismanagement of their Resurrection City encampment, McKnight contends that the campaign 
faced insurmountable obstacles from the beginning.  These obstacles included a lack of support 
from the Johnson White House, the FBI’s attempts to undermine the campaign through unlawful 
surveillance, and miserable weather conditions throughout the length of the encampment.
 
9
      During her term as president of the Organization of American Historians, Jacquelyn D. Hall 
implored scholars to produce studies that expand the scope of the civil rights movement.  Hall 
lamented the emergence of a “master narrative” of the civil rights movement, which “begins with 
the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, proceeds through public protests, and 
culminates with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”  
According to Hall, this dominant narrative presents the civil rights movement as a short, 
triumphal event that occurred exclusively in the South and resulted in the desegregation of public 
facilities and the extension of voting rights to African Americans.  In contrast to this brief and 
  
                                                          
7 Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg, Upheaval in the Quiet Zone: A History of Hospital Workers’ Union, Local 1199 
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 129-158. 
8 Christopher P. Lehman, Power, Politics, and the Decline of the Civil Rights Movement: A Fragile Coalition, 1967-
1973 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014), 108; Steve Estes, Charleston in Black and White: Race and Power in the 
South after the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 34. 
9 Gerald D. McKnight, The Last Crusade: Martin Luther King Jr., the FBI, and the Poor People’s Campaign (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1998), 141-143. 
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one-dimensional account, Hall argues that a more accurate framework of the black freedom 
struggle should begin in the 1930s and extend beyond the Voting Rights Act and into the final 
decades of the twentieth century.  Moreover, Hall contends that the “long civil rights movement” 
featured additional objectives beyond the acquisition of basic citizenship rights for African 
Americans, such as new opportunities for employment and economic advancement for women 
and racial minority groups.10
      In the years since Hall presented her argument for a new interpretive framework of the civil 
rights movement, numerous scholars produced studies that examine the black freedom struggle 
beyond the 1954-1965 timeframe.  Erik S. Gellman examined the National Negro Congress, a 
militant group of civil rights activists that operated in northern cities during the 1930s.  Jason 
Morgan Ward analyzed the long massive resistance movement to civil rights carried out by white 
segregationists from the 1930s through 1965 and in a separate study, he argues that America’s 
“civil rights century” began at the close of World War I when African Americans demanded the 
same freedom at home that America promoted abroad during the war.  Glenda Gilmore traced 
the origins of civil rights activism to the interwar period in the first half of the twentieth 
century.
 
11
      In addition to the scholarship on the early decades of the long civil rights movement, 
historians began to expand the timeframe of their studies to include the late 1960s, the entire 
1970s, and, in some cases, even the 1980s.  Joseph Crespino and Kevin M. Kruse produced 
  
                                                          
10 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American 
History, 91, 4 (March 2005): 1233-1263. 
11 Erik S. Gellman, Death Blow To Jim Crow: The National Negro Congress and the Rise of Militant Civil Rights 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Jason Morgan Ward, Defending White Democracy: The 
Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936-1965 (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2011); Jason Morgan Ward, Hanging Bridge: Racial Violence and America’s Civil Rights 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of 
Civil Rights, 1919-1950 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008). 
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monographs that analyze the rise of conservatism and the New Right as a reaction to federal 
court decisions of the 1950s and federal civil rights legislation of the 1960s in Mississippi and 
Atlanta, respectively.  Other scholars, such as Cynthia Griggs Fleming and Tomiko Brown-
Nagin examined grassroots efforts in the black freedom struggle throughout the 1970s and into 
the 1980s in rural Alabama and Atlanta, respectively.  Likewise, J. Todd Moye’s study of the 
black freedom activists and massive resistance groups in a rural Mississippi county covers a 
period of four decades, from 1945-1986.12
      Despite the recent surge of historical scholarship on the decades that preceded and followed 
the master narrative period, defined by Hall as 1954-1965, few scholars have examined the 
challenges encountered by the leaders of America’s prominent civil rights organizations 
following the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  The assassination of Martin Luther King 
Jr. robbed the SCLC of its president and left the movement without its symbolic leader, an 
individual capable of uniting diverse groups, such as middle-class black professionals, white 
liberals, and members of other civil rights organizations, under the common cause of equality.  
Ralph David Abernathy inherited the burden of succeeding a genuine icon of the movement just 
before the launch of SCLC’s most ambitious direct-action campaign since the Selma-to-
Montgomery Voting Rights March.  Moreover, Abernathy’s promotion came at a time when 
America’s political landscape began to shift and the election of Richard Nixon signaled a new 
era, which resulted in a decline in support for civil rights from the White House.  Yet many 
historians chose to focus their studies of the later civil rights era on local movements and 
 
                                                          
12 Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern 
Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Cynthia Griggs Fleming, In the Shadow of Selma: 
The Continuing Struggle for Civil Rights in the Rural South (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Tomiko 
Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long History of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); J. Todd Moye, Let The People Decide: Black Freedom and White Resistance Movements in 
Sunflower County, Mississippi, 1945-1986 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).  
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grassroots organizers instead of analyzing national civil rights leaders such as Abernathy as well 
as the leaders of emerging organizations such as Jesse Jackson, who broke away from SCLC to 
form People United to Save Humanity (PUSH), and Coretta Scott King, who sought to 
commemorate her husband’s legacy by establishing a center in his name. 
      Two recent studies analyze Abernathy’s stint as SCLC president after King’s death in 1968.  
Christopher P. Lehman examines Abernathy within the broader framework of the civil rights 
movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  However, Lehman’s study focuses on the national 
civil rights organizations during this period and other leaders such as King, as well as other 
groups such as SNCC, receive a significant amount of analysis in addition to Abernathy.  More 
recently, J. Michael Butler refers to the adversity Abernathy faced as SCLC president during the 
early 1970s in a study of the black freedom struggle in Escambia County, Florida.  Yet Butler’s 
book focuses on the protests and activism of the local affiliates of SCLC and the NAACP and he 
limits the discussion of Abernathy to the SCLC president’s specific interactions with H. K. 
Matthews, the founder of the organization’s Escambia County chapter.  By contrast, my study 
situates Abernathy and SCLC at the forefront of the later years of the civil rights movement.13
      The history of SCLC and the post-1968 civil rights movement remains incomplete without a 
thorough examination of Ralph David Abernathy’s tenure as the organization’s president.  
Previous studies of the organization’s activities either end with King’s death or include a brief 
discussion of Abernathy’s stint as a national civil rights leader.  This study analyzes Abernathy’s 
presidency and his subsequent campaign for a Congressional seat.  From the moment he became 
SCLC president in the spring of 1968 until the end of his campaign for Congress, Abernathy 
sought to advance King’s goal of eliminating poverty in America.  As the events in the ensuing 
 
                                                          
13 Christopher P. Lehman, Power, Politics, and the Decline of the Civil Rights Movement: A Fragile Coalition, 1967-
1973 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014); J. Michael Butler, Beyond Integration: The Black Freedom Struggle in 
Escambia County, Florida, 1960-1980 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016). 
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chapters illustrate, numerous obstacles, including some self-inflicted mistakes, prevented 
Abernathy from achieving this ambitious goal. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN 
 
      In the summer of 1965, after the Watts riots drew national attention to racism and tensions in 
Los Angeles, prominent historian C. Vann Woodward analyzed the results of the civil rights 
movement in an essay published in The New York Times Magazine.  Woodward lauded the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965: 
The result is one of the most impressive achievements in Congressional history.  
Within the past year, under Administration pressure, Congress has put more teeth 
in the law and more law on the books than it has in the whole period since 1875.  
It was as if the first Reconstruction had been endowed with the 14th and 15th 
Amendments, the Reconstruction Acts, the Freedmen’s Bureau, the Civil Rights 
Acts and the Ku Klux Klan Act by one session of Congress.14
Yet the majority of Woodward’s essay featured his thoughts on the future of the civil rights 
movement after the passage of new federal laws that effectively ended racial discrimination in 
public accommodations and provided voting rights to African Americans.  After describing the 
various factions within the civil rights community, Woodward foresaw a shift in the objectives 
and strategies of the movement’s activists during the second half of the 1960s and the dawn of 
the 1970s.  According to Woodward, “In the years ahead, several changes in the movement seem 
probable.  Protest will continue, perhaps intensify, but unless the movement disintegrates in 
explosions of big-city slum insurrection, the trend will be, as Rustin suggests, from protest to 
 
                                                          
14 C. Vann Woodward, “After Watts—Where is the Negro Revolution Headed?” The New York Times Magazine, 
August 29, 1965, 104, 289, 338-341. 
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politics.  As civil rights diminish in importance, the shift from status politics to economic politics 
will increase.”15
      Martin Luther King Jr., president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 
shared his vision for a major protest designed to enhance the economic position of poor people.  
In the midst of participating in the Meredith Freedom March in June 1966, King and SCLC 
executive vice-president Ralph David Abernathy visited an elementary school in Marks, 
Mississippi.  The meager food provisions each student received at lunch stunned the two civil 
rights activists.  Abernathy and King witnessed each student receive a few crackers and a quarter 
slice of an apple for lunch.  According to Abernathy, the scene left an indelible impression with 
King and served as the inspiration for the Poor People’s Campaign, which the SCLC launched 
two years later.  King believed the campaign would shine a spotlight on the conditions of abject 
poverty that many Americans encountered on a daily basis, “We can’t let that kind of poverty 
exist in this country.  I don’t think people really know that little school children are slowly 
starving in the United States of America.  I didn’t know it.”
 
16
      By the fall of 1967, King began to plan the Poor People’s Campaign.  Alarmed by both the 
shifting trend within the black freedom struggle as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), younger African Americans embracing black power, and race riots in 
Detroit and Newark, King decided SCLC needed to initiate a direct-action campaign.  After 
settling on setting up a mass encampment of poor people in Washington, D.C., King began to 
organize what he viewed as perhaps the last best hope to spur the government into enacting 
meaningful legislation to improve economic conditions for the nation’s poor.  In late January 
 
                                                          
15 Ibid, 341 
16 Ralph David Abernathy, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York: HarperPerennial, 1990) 412-413 
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1968, Jean M. White described King’s mindset in the months preceding the Poor People’s 
Campaign in the Washington Post. “As King sees it, a new kind of Selma or Birmingham is 
needed to dramatize the economic plight of the Negro and compel the Government to act.  He 
also personally needs something dramatic to shore up his leadership among the Negroes if he is 
to be heard above shouts of black power.”17
      Although King and his SCLC aides targeted impoverished African Americans as primary 
participants in the campaign, they intended to present a diverse and eclectic mosaic of America’s 
poor citizens.  According to Andrew Young, one of King’s top advisors, the Poor People’s 
Campaign would include poor citizens from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds, although 
African Americans would comprise the bulk of the campaign’s 3,000 protesters.  King’s goals 
for the campaign consisted of an ambitious set of economic initiatives that he hoped Congress 
would pass in response to the persistent pressure applied by 3,000 protesters living in a 
shantytown in the shadow of the Capitol.  White suggested King’s initial requests of Congress 
would likely include “a guaranteed income, a $20 billion-a-year program to help the poor, (and) 
a $1000-per-pupil expenditure in ghetto schools.”
 
18
      By February 1968, King and his aides drafted a list of demands for Congress, which they 
deemed necessary to alleviate economic inequality in America.  Framing these requests as an 
“economic and social Bill of Rights,” King’s list included “Passage of an Emergency 
Employment Act of the type approved by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 
1967.”  King specified that an employment act needed to create at least 250,000 jobs in the 
public sector, including positions within the fields of “health, public safety, education, 
 
                                                          
17 Jean M. White, “King ‘Going for Broke’ on April Drive for Poor,” Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1968, A1, A6. 
18 Ibid. 
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recreation” along with a host of other departments at the municipal, state, and federal levels of 
government.  Other provisions within the proposed Bill of Rights included the addition of the 
Sub-Employment Index to the Department of Labor’s monthly employment statistics, and a 
nationwide expansion of Turnkey III, a federal housing project that provided 200 homes for 
impoverished families near Gulfport, Mississippi.  Another request demanded a fund “for an 
immediate beginning of work on a racially and socially integrated model city for 250,000 
citizens and a commitment to build such a city, with requisite federal subsidies, as quickly as 
possible.”19
      King delegated the planning duties for the Poor People’s Campaign to Bernard Lafayette Jr., 
a former SNCC field secretary who joined SCLC as the organization’s program director in the 
fall of 1967.  Lafayette’s organizational skills paid immediate dividends during the initial 
planning phase of the campaign in the early months of 1968.  Lafayette persuaded Anthony 
Henry and William Moyer, two community organizers from the American Friends Service 
Committee, to lay the foundation of the campaign from the SCLC’s Washington office.  As a 
result, numerous Washington groups publicly supported the campaign, including the Council of 
Churches of Greater Washington, the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, the 
Washington Teachers Union, and the National Association of Social Workers.
 
20
      Unbeknownst to King, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover directed his agents to work on 
undermining the campaign before SCLC and its recruits could arrive in Washington in late April.  
Officially known as POCAM, the bureau’s crusade against the Poor People’s Campaign involved 
 
                                                          
19 First Draft of SCLC message “To the President, Congress, and Supreme Court of the United States,” February 
6,1968, SCLC Papers, Stuart A. Rose Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University, Box 10, Folder 
2; For more on Turnkey III, see Debbie Z. Harwell, Wednesdays in Mississippi: Proper Ladies Working for Radical 
Change, Freedom Summer 1964 (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2014) 176-178. 
20 Gerald D. McKnight, The Last Crusade: Martin Luther King Jr., the FBI, and the Poor People’s Campaign (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1998) 25. 
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local field agents discrediting King’s planned demonstration through false rumors of a lack of 
SCLC funding and a threat of the cancellation of federal welfare checks for any individuals who 
joined the campaign as participants.  Local field offices instructed informants to spread these 
rumors and warnings throughout the neighborhoods and communities where low-income African 
American families resided.  James A. Harrison, SCLC’s comptroller, provided the FBI with 
extensive knowledge of the organization’s plans as a paid informant.21
      In addition to the FBI’s covert efforts to sabotage the campaign, King and SCLC encountered 
another unforeseen challenge to the Washington demonstration.  In February, racial tensions 
reached a crescendo in Memphis when more than half of the city’s predominantly black 
sanitation workers went on strike.  The striking workers demanded better working conditions and 
the right to unionize.  On March 18, just over a month after the strike commenced, King traveled 
to the city to address the striking workers and their supporters at Mason Temple.  King’s speech 
echoed the sentiments of Rev. James M. Lawson Jr., a Memphis-based minister and SNCC 
veteran, who described the strike to The New York Times as “a significant turn in the civil rights 
movement and a new chapter in labor history.  Never before has a union been backed by a whole 
community like this.”
 
22
      Ten days after his address at Mason Temple, King returned to Memphis to lead a march of 
demonstrators through the city’s downtown streets.  King’s best intentions of leading a 
nonviolent march of peaceful protesters fell by the wayside when African American youths 
began to destroy storefront windows and loot local businesses.  Memphis police responded by 
using tear gas, mace, and batons on the rioters.  When violence enveloped the march, King and 
 
                                                          
21 Ibid, 23, 25-26 
22 Sylvan Fox, “Memphis is Beset By Racial Tension: Garbage Strike Has Become a Major Rights Dispute,” The New 
York Times, March 18, 1968, 28; McKnight, 50-52 
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his aides quickly departed the scene in a vehicle that delivered them to a local motel.  Amidst the 
chaos, Memphis police officer Leslie Dean Jones shot and killed Larry Payne, a 16-year-old 
African American.  Jones contended that he spotted Payne carrying a television near a local 
department store targeted by looters and pursued the youth into the basement of an apartment. 
The officer claimed Payne charged at him with butcher knife, which caused him to open fire, 
killing Payne.23
      As he watched reports of the riot on television in his hotel suite that evening, King worried 
that he would take the blame for the violent outcome of the march.  Unlike some of the prior 
protests he conducted in Birmingham and Selma, King and his aides did not train the striking 
Memphis sanitation workers in nonviolent tactics prior to the march.  Moreover, King arrived in 
Memphis an hour after the march’s scheduled 10 a.m. start and he joined the in-progress protest.  
Though it remains unclear whether the rioting African American youths participated in the 
march from its outset or used the protest as an opportunity to shield authorities from their 
vandalism, King voiced his displeasure at the unfortunate turn of events to Ralph Abernathy and 
Bernard Lee.  According to Abernathy, a frustrated King proclaimed, “Maybe we’ll just have to 
let violence run its course.  Maybe people will listen to the voice of violence.  They certainly 
won’t listen to us.”
  
24
      One day after the Memphis riots King affirmed his commitment to nonviolence. He declared 
that the upcoming Poor People’s Campaign, slated to begin in Washington three weeks later, 
would take place without the violence that derailed the Memphis march.  In a press conference, 
King admitted that the outbreak of violence caught him off-guard.  The SCLC president insisted 
 
                                                          
23 Walter Rugaber, “A Negro is Killed in Memphis March,” The New York Times, March 29, 1968, 1, 29; McKnight, 
55-56. 
24 Rugaber; Abernathy, 419-420. 
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that, “If I had known there was a possibility of violence yesterday I would not have had that 
particular march.”  Determined to demonstrate that peaceful protests could take place in 
Memphis, King vowed to return to the city “as quickly as possible” to lead another march.  King 
added that the encampment planned for the nation’s capital would feature nonviolent protests.  
Yet he did not issue an assurance that the campaign would take place free of any disturbances.  
Instead, King explained that “Riots are part of the ugly atmosphere of our society.  I cannot 
guarantee that riots will not take place this summer.  I can only guarantee that our 
demonstrations will not be violent.”25
      In contrast to King’s determination to hold nonviolent protests in Memphis and Washington, 
several politicians expressed their belief that the Memphis riots served as a harbinger to a 
volatile and unpredictable mass protest in the nation’s capital.  Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) 
called for the government to seek a court order to prevent King and the SCLC from staging any 
kind of demonstration.  Addressing his concerns about King’s planned campaign a day after the 
Memphis riots, Byrd remarked, “If this self-seeking rabble-rouser is allowed to go through with 
his plans here, Washington may well be treated to the same kind of violence, destruction, 
looting, and bloodshed.” Another conservative Democrat, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, 
suggested that King’s protest consist of a small group of individuals who “symbolically” travel 
to Capitol Hill in order to address their concerns with the plight of the nation’s poor.  Stennis 
thought the government should block any larger constituency of protesters from entering the city.  
In addition to Byrd and Stennis, Senator Edward Brooke, a Massachusetts Republican and the 
only African American member of Congress’s upper chamber, also doubted that King and his 
aides could effectively control protesters.  Brooke wondered, “How do you avoid assembling 
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that many people under the inflammable conditions that exist today where one little spark—some 
irresponsible kid—could set it off?  How do you keep looters out?”26
      Another Memphis march presented King with an opportunity to demonstrate that the 
nonviolent tactics he employed for years could still unite the black community and force 
lawmakers into improving the lives of African American citizens by passing meaningful 
legislation.  Six weeks before the march, Robert C. Maynard addressed the challenges facing 
King and SCLC in the Washington Post.  In an article published under the headline “Is King’s 
Nonviolence Now Old-Fashioned?” Maynard, a black correspondent, expressed concern over 
King’s place among black civil rights leaders if the Poor People’s Campaign failed.  Maynard 
posed questions that suggested a harsh reality for King and SCLC if the campaign did not 
resonate with the American public, “If that happens, what becomes of Martin Luther King? What 
becomes of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference?  Most important, what becomes of 
the nonviolence that Dr. King, almost alone of the great civil rights leaders of the 1960s, still 
espouses?”  Since the violence that accompanied the Memphis march occurred just six weeks 
after reporters like Maynard questioned the relevance of King’s nonviolent methods, the SCLC 
president needed to return to Memphis in order to demonstrate that his organization’s approach 
remained effective and would work in Washington.
  
27
      Yet King understood that the “economic politics” Woodward identified as the new focus of 
the civil rights movement nearly three years earlier remained the most important objective of his 
organization, even above a massive nonviolent demonstration in Washington.  In a sermon in the 
city’s National Cathedral on March 31, King acknowledged the possibility of eschewing the Poor 
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People’s Campaign if President Johnson and the U.S. Congress took significant steps toward 
improving the bleak economic conditions that existed in urban communities across the country.  
In a news conference following the service, King told the press that, “I would be glad to talk to 
President Johnson or anyone else. But I wouldn’t say that a mere statement that something will 
be done—just a pat on the back—would cause us to call off the march.”28
      Instead, King wanted specific details on potential federal aid packages, including dates and 
procedures for disbursement to potential recipients.  According to King, “It would have to be 
something much more specific—would have to be a commitment with a positive timetable for 
this summer—for us to call off the march.  And I don’t see that forthcoming.”  The SCLC 
president even suggested that he would move the campaign to the respective political 
conventions if Johnson and other elected officials ignored the Washington demonstration.  King 
issued a warning to both political parties. “They will have a real awakening in Chicago,” he told 
Ben A. Franklin from The New York Times.  “That does not mean that the Republicans can feel 
that they will not experience the same thing at their convention in Miami.”
 
29
      When King returned to Memphis on April 3, he learned that U.S. District Court Judge Bailey 
Brown granted a temporary restraining order at the request of Fred Gianotti, Memphis’s city 
attorney.  Memphis mayor Henry Loeb instructed Gianotti to seek the restraining order, which 
barred King from holding any protest march in the city.  In the wake of the turmoil that occurred 
during King’s march the previous week, Gianotti argued that another protest march might result 
in “great damage” in Memphis, where racial tensions remained high in the midst of the sanitation 
workers’ strike.  Frustrated with a court order that he viewed as “illegal and unconstitutional,” 
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King sought to get the ruling overturned as quickly as possible.  If his legal team failed to win a 
reversal of the restraining order, King vowed to violate the ruling.  In his comments to the press, 
King framed the conflict in moral terms, “It will be on the basis of my conscience saying that we 
have a moral right and responsibility to march.”30
      The restraining order postponed King’s march, originally scheduled for Friday April 5, at 
least until the following Monday.  In the meantime, while his lawyers prepared to challenge the 
restraining order, King returned to the Mason Temple and delivered a stirring public speech. 
According to Abernathy, King initially decided to skip the appearance due to the strong 
possibility of a low turnout since afternoon thunderstorms persisted in Memphis throughout the 
evening hours.  Accompanied by Jesse Jackson, Abernathy arrived at the church and saw a 
crowd of “about five hundred people” and a phalanx of local television cameras.  Abernathy 
called King and persuaded the SCLC president to come to the church and address the 
surprisingly sizable audience.  Following an introduction by Abernathy, King stressed the need 
to continue using nonviolent procedures in direct-action protests, including marches and 
economic boycotts.  King concluded the speech with an eerie prediction of his own death, “Like 
anybody, I would like to live a long life.  Longevity has its place.  But I’m not concerned about 
that now.  I just want to do God’s will.  And He’s allowed me to go up to the mountain, and I’ve 
looked over, and I’ve seen the promised land.  I may not get there with you.  But I want you to 
know tonight that we as a people will get to the promised land.”
 
31
      King died the next day, shot by James Earl Ray as King stood on the balcony of his suite at 
the Lorraine Motel.  Two days later, with King’s body housed at a local funeral home, Ralph 
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David Abernathy succeeded Martin Luther King Jr. as president of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, the civil rights organization the two men helped establish a decade 
earlier.32
      Three years before King’s assassination in Memphis, SCLC revised its bylaws to account for 
a presidential succession plan in the event that King died while serving as the organization’s 
president.  At King’s request, the organization officially designated Ralph David Abernathy as 
his successor immediately following his death.  Although Abernathy and King remained 
virtually inseparable throughout their thirteen-year partnership, several SCLC leaders, including 
King’s father, who served on the organization’s board, privately disagreed with the decision.  
They viewed the decision as King’s concession to his friend for years of loyal service and a 
means to placate Abernathy.  Some of the organization’s staff members believed that he 
remained jealous that King, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, did not insist that 
Abernathy also receive recognition as a co-recipient of the award.
 
33
      As a result of King’s death, Abernathy became the president of SCLC, the most prominent 
civil rights organization in America in 1968.  Many Americans, in both the African American 
and white communities, knew nothing about Ralph David Abernathy. On April 6, The New York 
Times described Abernathy as “calm, slow-talking and very polite,” while King “was the 
leader—eloquent and beloved by the crowds.” The profile included basic biographic details on 
Abernathy and his family along with the origin story of his friendship with King, a relationship 
that began in the midst of the Montgomery Bus Boycott.  The newspaper noted the close 
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relationship between Abernathy and King, including the fact that many of his associates viewed 
Abernathy as “Dr. King’s alter ego.”34
      Two days later, the Chicago Defender, one of the nation’s most influential African American 
newspapers, published a similar profile of Abernathy.  The newspaper informed its readers that 
Abernathy “marched at King’s side, made tours for him and spoke in his absence when King’s 
crushing schedule forced him to cancel a speech, but Abernathy’s style kept him in the 
background.”  According to the article, Abernathy “is a gifted speaker, but lacks the oratorical 
talents King had and the charisma King possessed.”  After predicting that Abernathy would 
likely lean on SCLC’s top officials through the duration of the Poor People’s Campaign, the 
newspaper concluded that, “He is unlikely to emerge as another Martin Luther King.”
 
35
      Born on March 11, 1926, Abernathy spent his childhood on a farm near tiny Linden, 
Alabama, a rural community in the state’s west central region.  At the time of Abernathy’s birth, 
Linden’s population stood at 700 residents.  (According to a 2015 estimate, the current 
population of Abernathy’s hometown sits at 2,025 residents).
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Him.”  Several hours after listening to his mother’s instructions, the young Abernathy 
experienced a spiritual awakening and established a lifelong connection with God.  According to 
Abernathy, “My sins had been forgiven.  I had been reborn.”37
      Following a stint in the U.S. Army during the final years of World War II, Abernathy 
returned to Alabama.  Using the money he received from the G.I. Bill, Abernathy enrolled at 
Alabama State College, a historically black, four-year school located in the state’s capital city of 
Montgomery.  During his college years, Abernathy participated in his first protests.  As president 
of the college’s student council, Abernathy organized a campus-wide hunger strike to protest the 
striking disparity in food quality between the students’ meals and the entrées reserved for the 
college’s faculty.  While faculty members ate “huge hunks of real ham” for dinner, the dining 
staff only provided “Spam and unbuttered grits” for students.  Midway through the second day of 
the strike, following four meals which the students skipped, the college’s president, H.C. 
Trenholm, summoned Abernathy to his office for a meeting.  Trenholm assured Abernathy that 
the quality of meals would improve as soon as the students returned to the dining hall.  When the 
students arrived at the dining hall for dinner that evening, plates of fried chicken awaited them.  
For Abernathy, the strike provided an unforgettable lesson on confrontations with authority 
figures, “You can deal with the most awesome authority on an equal basis if the people are on 
your side.”
 
38
      One year after the hunger strike, Abernathy organized another campus protest.  In order to 
meet the housing needs of a male student body that continued to increase with the addition of 
former servicemen, the college acquired military barracks from nearby Maxwell Air Force Base.  
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The male students viewed the older barracks as substandard living facilities due to faulty 
showers, dilapidated toilets, and an unreliable heating system during the winter months.  After 
listening to the complaints of his fellow residents, Abernathy organized another campus protest.  
He also scheduled a meeting with Trenholm and Levi Watkins, the man who oversaw the 
acquisition and upkeep of the on-campus barracks.  Accompanied by a group of his peers, 
Abernathy expressed his concerns with the unsuitable living conditions to Trenholm, who asked 
Watkins about the validity of the students’ depiction of the residential facilities.  When Watkins 
verified the inadequate conditions within the antiquated barracks, Trenholm announced a plan to 
enhance the college’s male residential facilities.  Abernathy cited his two meetings with 
Trenholm as pivotal moments for the challenges he led as a civil rights leader in the decades that 
followed his college years.  According to Abernathy,  
The victories I won were relatively small, but their importance to my own self-
confidence cannot be overestimated.  I believe that my later dealings with mayors, 
governors, and presidents were significantly facilitated by these two meetings in 
Dr. Trenholm’s office.  As a matter of fact, no man ever intimidated me in the 
same way that Dr. Trenholm did; and when I met Presidents Johnson, Nixon, 
Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush they somehow seemed lesser men than this stern 
black scholar, with his regal bearing and his steady, dispassionate gaze.39
 
  
            After graduating from Alabama State in 1950, Abernathy resisted the urge to pursue a 
full-time career as pastor.  Instead, he moved to Atlanta and enrolled in graduate school at 
Atlanta University.  During his years in graduate school, Abernathy encountered Martin Luther 
King Jr. for the first time.  Following his first year in graduate school at Crozer Theological 
Seminary in Pennsylvania, King returned to Atlanta and served as a guest preacher at Ebenezer 
Baptist Church, where his father presided as pastor.  One Sunday, Abernathy decided to attend a 
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service at the church in order to observe the young preacher that a fellow classmate told him 
about.  Abernathy recognized the preternatural oratorical skills possessed by King, “Already he 
was a scholar; and while he didn’t holler as loud as some of the more famous preachers I had 
heard, he could holler loud enough when he wanted to.  Even then I could tell that he was a man 
with a special gift from God.”  As he exited the church, Abernathy greeted King in the receiving 
line, introduced himself, and commended the guest preacher on his sermon.40
      Several days later, the two men met again at a choir recital on the campus of Spelman 
College.  Unbeknownst to King, Abernathy recognized his date, who previously feigned an 
illness to get out of attending the event with him.  A few years later, Abernathy recounted the 
story to King who had traveled to Montgomery to audition for the open pastorate at Dexter 
Avenue Baptist Church.  With both men happily married to other women by then, they shared a 
hearty laugh.
  
41
      By 1954, both King and Abernathy held pastorates at prominent churches in Montgomery.  
At the age of twenty-six, Abernathy accepted the pulpit at First Baptist Church in the summer of 
1952.  The 25-year-old King succeeded Vernon Johns as the pastor at Dexter Avenue Baptist 
Church in the fall of 1954.  On December 1, 1955, just over a year after King arrived in 
Montgomery, Rosa Parks, a seamstress and secretary of the city’s NAACP chapter, refused to 
give up her seat to a white passenger on a city bus.  Following her arrest, Parks told E.D. Nixon, 
a prominent black union leader in Montgomery, and Clifford Durr, a white lawyer, that she 
would challenge the arrest in an effort to strike down the city’s segregation law.  Within a week, 
a group of the city’s African American leaders, including Nixon, Abernathy, and King organized 
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a boycott of the city’s bus system.  On December 5, the group held a meeting to create an 
organization to coordinate the bus boycott.  The group chose King to lead the new Montgomery 
Improvement Association and Abernathy agreed to serve as the organization’s program 
chairman.42
      Neither King nor Abernathy anticipated that the boycott would last for 381 days or that it 
would change the course of their professional careers.  At the time, both men sought to establish 
their careers as Baptist pastors and while they recognized the need to serve as leaders of 
Montgomery’s black community, neither man realized the effect of the boycott on their own 
lives.  Three decades after the boycott occurred, Abernathy reflected on the conflict it presented 
to the two young preachers, “Neither one of us believed he was ready to lead a national crusade.  
Martin wanted a few more years of experience in the pulpit.  I wanted a Ph.D.  Both of us 
believed that because we were still in our twenties, we did not have the maturity necessary to 
confront the formidable white leadership arrayed against us in every state capitol and county 
courthouse in the South.”
 
43
      Yet the success of the boycott, which ended December 20, 1956 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the ruling of a federal court ruling that declared the city’s segregated bus 
ordinances unconstitutional, catapulted King into the national spotlight as an effective civil rights 
activist.  Within two months of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Browder v. Gayle, King and 
Abernathy, along with several other leading African American preachers, including C.K. Steele 
of Tallahassee, Theodore J. Jemison of Baton Rouge, and A.L. Davis of New Orleans, created 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.  On the heels of his successful stint leading the 
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Montgomery Improvement Association, King agreed to serve as the organization’s first 
president.  The group chose Abernathy as the organization’s treasurer.44
      Together, the two men collaborated on a relentless campaign to end segregation in the South 
and enhance economic opportunities for poor African Americans throughout the nation.  Their 
activism spanned thirteen years, countless jail cells, and included landmark victories in 
Birmingham and Selma as well as frustrating defeats in Albany and Chicago.  King’s death in 
Memphis thrust Abernathy into the spotlight to carry on the grand plans of his closest friend’s 
final attempt to improve the lives of America’s poor citizens. 
 
      Two weeks after King’s death, Abernathy announced that SCLC planned to launch the Poor 
People’s Campaign on April 29.  Addressing the media at a news conference in Atlanta, 
Abernathy described the organization’s intent to stage “the most militant and aggressive 
nonviolent war ever waged by the human and civil rights movement in this country.”  Abernathy 
outlined the SCLC’s objective to “lead waves of American poor people to Washington,” and he 
vowed that “we will stay there, engaging in militant nonviolent action, until the Congress deals 
with the issue of poverty and racism in the United States.”  According to Abernathy, the 
campaign would unfold in two stages.  The campaign would kick off with a delegation of 100 
individuals traveling to Washington on April 29 in order to meet with politicians and government 
officials. Slated to begin on May 2, the second stage would begin with a ceremony honoring 
King’s memory at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis and continue with a march to the nation’s 
capital.45
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      In addition to honoring King’s memory, the decision to proceed with the Poor People’s 
Campaign provided the SCLC with an opportunity to raise money and awareness regarding 
poverty in America.  King’s death generated a wave of donations to SCLC and the organization’s 
leaders believed the campaign would inspire more donors to pledge gifts to fund their work.  
According to Hosea Williams, one of the campaign’s regional coordinators, the assassination of 
King caused donors who previously rebuffed the organization’s request for financial support to 
reconsider: “Elements that were dead set against us are now prone to be more cooperative.  We 
find ourselves in a new position, and we hope we can make the best of it.”  As a result, the 
Memphis march served as a prelude to the Poor People’s Campaign, a much larger 
demonstration with more ambitious goals than the resolution of a municipal sanitation workers’ 
strike.  On April 27, two days before the scheduled launch of the campaign, the Chicago 
Defender outlined the stakes of the campaign for its readers, “Thus, the nation is in for a 
considerable period of protest this spring—which is likely either to spur anti-poverty measures or 
end in rioting, as one of the Memphis demonstrations did.  What would come of the protests 
depends largely on what control is maintained by SCLC over them.”46
      As Abernathy and his SCLC colleagues prepared for an indefinite encampment in 
Washington, opponents of the campaign spoke out against the pending demonstration.  Senator 
Russell Long (D-LA) vowed that he would demand the censure or expulsion of any member of 
Congress who supported “bending the knee” to accommodate the requests of the campaign’s 
leaders.  Long suggested a relocation of the capital if local and federal authorities permitted the 
demonstrations to occur in Washington: “When that bunch of marchers comes here, they can just 
burn the whole place down and we can just move the capital to some place where they enforce 
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the law.”  In addition to Long, Dr. Thomas W. Matthew, a prominent black businessman, 
announced his opposition to the guaranteed income provisions sought by the campaign’s leaders.  
According to Matthew, “Our grandparents had a guaranteed annual income.  They called it 
slavery.  We should know better.”  As an alternative, Matthew proposed a ten-year self-help 
economic development program that would consist of a combination of public and private loans, 
including $100 million in annual federal loans at two percent interest, 20-year private loans at 
four percent interest, and loans from foreign investors at six percent interest over five years.47
      On April 29, Abernathy led a group of approximately 150 individuals into Washington to 
launch the Poor People’s Campaign.  Abernathy engaged in a series of discussions with a range 
of Cabinet officials from the Johnson White House, including Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. 
Freeman, Attorney General Ramsay Clark, and Labor Secretary W. Willard Wertz.  During the 
meetings, Abernathy expressed a set of SCLC’s concerns regarding the obstacles faced by the 
nation’s poor.  Abernathy issued the following request to Wertz, “We ask you to eliminate 
programs that try to fit poor people to a system that has systematically excluded them from 
sharing in America’s plenty.  We say that the system must change and adjust to the needs of 
millions who are unemployed or under-employed.”  The group presented a statement in their 
meeting with Clark that outlined their frustration with the relationship between the poor and law 
enforcement agencies claiming, “Justice is not a reality for the black, Mexican-American, Indian 
and Puerto Rican poor.”  The statement cited an increasing wave of discrimination in multiple 
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areas, including housing, education, and employment, as contributing factors to the distrust 
between poor citizens and law enforcement officials.48
      Abernathy and his delegation of his supporters came away from their meetings encouraged 
with the Johnson Administration’s willingness to listen to their grievances about the nation’s 
failure to provide adequate opportunities for its poor citizens to escape poverty.  Yet the group 
remained firm in their demands, particularly their primary stipulation of jobs for every able-
bodied citizen and a guaranteed income for individuals who lacked the minimum capabilities for 
employment.  Abernathy assured reporters that “we’ll be back in 10 days for some answers,” 
from federal government officials.
 
49
      Returning to the scene of King’s death, Abernathy officially launched the Poor People’s 
Campaign on May 2 with a ceremony in Memphis at the balcony of the Lorraine Motel suite 
where King died nearly a month earlier.  The SCLC president marked the transition between the 
mourning of King’s death and the beginning of the campaign that had consumed the final months 
of his life, “The moment has come.  The days of weeping are ended.  The days of march have 
begun.”  Following the ceremony, eight busloads of African American supporters traveled from 
Memphis to Marks, Mississippi, the site of King’s confrontation with the abject poverty that 
black schoolchildren encountered on a daily basis at lunchtime two years earlier.  Noting the 
numerous logistical changes involving lodging—SCLC officials split the delegation of marchers 
into separate groups with “about 300” spending the night in Marks and the remainder returning 
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to Memphis—the Associated Press characterized the campaign’s launch as a “confused opening 
day.”50
      Shortly after Abernathy and the campaign’s participants began their caravan to Washington 
from Memphis and the Mississippi Delta, Lyndon Johnson spoke publicly about the massive 
demonstration that would eventually occur in the nation’s capital.  One day after the campaign 
launched, Johnson expressed his hope that the protesters allow Congress and the federal 
government the opportunity to address any grievances they brought forth upon their arrival in the 
nation’s capital.  Since Abernathy echoed King’s promise of remaining encamped with 
supporters in Washington for the duration of the summer if necessary, Johnson urged that the 
demonstrators should step back and let the government work instead of engaging in an indefinite 
demonstration.  In Johnson’s view, “We do expect that the poor will be better served if, after that 
viewpoint is presented, that the Congress and the appropriate administrative agencies can have 
the time to try to act upon it and execute it.”
 
51
      Despite the logistical missteps that hampered the campaign’s first day, the caravan began to 
gain momentum by the end of its opening week.  On May 6, a group of “nearly one thousand 
Negroes” marched through Selma, Alabama, site of a brutal attack on civil rights demonstrators 
during a 1965 march in support of the Voting Rights Act.  Abernathy led the marchers through 
downtown Selma where demonstrators paused to remember fallen civil rights activists by placing 
memorial wreaths around the city.
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capitol city, a large contingent of supporters joined for the march through Montgomery’s 
downtown streets.  According to an account of the Selma-to-Montgomery leg of the caravan in 
The New York Times, a crowd of “some 2,000 persons were walking along behind Mr. 
Abernathy” by the time the march ended in the city’s “predominantly Negro west side.”53
      Three days after the Montgomery portion of the caravan, the SCLC received a permit from 
the National Park Service to build a temporary encampment in Washington D.C., in a section of 
West Potomac Park, located near the Lincoln Memorial.  With Abernathy still leading the 
caravan in the Deep South, Lafayette, the SCLC program director, addressed the news media at a 
press conference on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.  The permit allowed a group of 3,000 
activists to reside in the encampment from May 11 until 8 p.m. on June 16.  In addition, the 
permit could be renewed if necessary.  At the press conference, Lafayette declared that “We are 
here to stay and to conduct our campaign until our demands are met.”
 
54
      When the caravan reached Atlanta, King’s hometown and the headquarters of the SCLC, 
Abernathy delivered a passionate speech at the Butler Street YMCA’s Hunger Club tribute to 
King on May 8.  In a nearly hour-long address, Abernathy promised to continue King’s mission 
of eliminating poverty in America.  Vowing to serve “as the same kind of troublemaker as 
Martin Luther King,” Abernathy declared that, “If we can spend billions to send a man to the 
moon, we can spend billions to stand a man on his feet.”  The SCLC president added that poor 
people “aren’t begging for charity, we are demanding civilized justice.  We are not asking for 
favors, we are talking about equality.”  Like his predecessor, Abernathy realized the stakes 
involved with the Poor People’s Campaign.  He told the nearly 400 attendees that the campaign 
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might represent the “last attempt anybody is going to make to deal with these problems 
peacefully.”55
      Abernathy’s remarks resonated with the interracial crowd at the Hunger Club tribute.  
Audience applause interrupted Abernathy sixteen times during his speech.
 
56  Despite a few 
logistical glitches, the early weeks of the Poor People’s Campaign, beginning with the launch of 
the caravan in Marks, resulted in favorable media coverage for Abernathy and the SCLC.  As 
Gerald McKnight notes, “The national press, including some large southern dailies, the three 
major television networks, and Britain’s BBC, recognized good copy when they saw it, giving 
the mule train broad and sustained coverage.”   Abernathy and Hosea Williams rode in the lead 
wagon, driven by mules who received the derisive monikers “Stennis” and “Eastland,” after 
Mississippi’s two segregationist senators.  In front of crowds of supporters and members of the 
news media, the two SCLC leaders often joked about the origin of the mules’ monikers.57
      Within a week of his address at the Butler Street YMCA, Abernathy arrived in Washington 
to open Resurrection City, the encampment where campaign demonstrators would reside during 
the campaign.  On May 13, Abernathy “drove a ceremonial nail” into the stake of the first of 
hundreds of plywood shelters erected to house campaign participants.  The SCLC president 
informed reporters that the campaign would last “until the Congress of the United States decide 
that they are going to do something about the plight of the poor people by doing away with 
poverty, unemployment and underemployment in this country.”  Before hammering away at the 
ceremonial nail, Abernathy asked a young Native American woman from the Creek Nation of 
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Oklahoma for permission to “use this land.”  After she granted “permission,” Abernathy 
christened the encampment “Resurrection City, U.S.A.”58
      With the launch of the Poor People’s Campaign and the construction of Resurrection City 
complete, the focus of the campaign shifted toward meetings with government officials, life in 
the encampment, and Abernathy’s performance in his first significant leadership opportunity as 
SCLC president.  Two days after the opening of Resurrection City, Abernathy met with a large 
delegation of Congress—seven senators and 65 representatives—on Capitol Hill to discuss the 
goals of the campaign.  He reassured the elected officials that the campaign’s demonstrations 
would remain peaceful and “disruptions of the government” would only occur “as a last resort” 
in the event that negotiations failed. 
  
      While Abernathy met with congressional leaders to promote the campaign, he remained the 
focus of reporters who speculated about how he would lead this large-scale project designed by 
his predecessor.  Thrust into the most prominent leadership position among the nation’s civil 
rights organizations just five weeks before the opening of Resurrection City, Abernathy went 
from serving as a loyal acolyte at King’s side to the face of SCLC just as the organization 
launched its most ambitious direct-action campaign since Selma.  With thousands of 
demonstrators descending on Washington to participate in the campaign, reporters and 
politicians wondered how Abernathy would fare as the leader of an ambitious campaign devised 
by his iconic predecessor.  On May 18, the Chicago Defender published a UPI story in which 
three of the wire service’s reporters “pool their impressions in the following team report on the 
little-known but suddenly powerful man who emerged from obscurity to succeed Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr.”  The article provided readers with basic biographical details about Abernathy 
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and his relationship with King.  According to one civil rights activist “who worked closely” with 
both men, “Without Ralph Abernathy, Martin Luther King would have been something entirely 
different than he was.  Ralph was a doer, the glue that held SCLC together.  When Martin got 
discouraged it was Ralph who kept him going.”59
      Henry P. Leifermann, a UPI reporter who covered both King and Abernathy, acknowledged 
that SCLC would likely remain committed to nonviolent demonstrations with Abernathy as 
president of the organization.  Yet Leifermann also posited that the organization would become 
“much more black-oriented” and “dominated by the style of the rural Southern Baptist preacher” 
embodied by Abernathy.  With the public demonstration phase of the Poor People’s Campaign 
set to begin the following week, Louis Cassels alluded to the possibility of a showdown between 
Abernathy and Lyndon Johnson if the campaign persisted beyond the end of May.  As Cassels 
noted, “At this point, no one—including Ralph Abernathy and Lyndon Johnson—can be sure 
what’s ahead.”  Cassels included a quote from Abernathy to illustrate the SCLC’s commitment 
to continue the campaign until Congress met the organization’s demands, “Congress has never 
done anything for Negroes or poor people except in response to pressure.  We cannot afford to 
relent for America’s sake as well as our own.  If this non-violent campaign fails, it will bring out 
the more militant groups who are just waiting for us to fail.  They’re the ones who want to burn 
down the country.”
  
60
      Although the Poor People’s Campaign began with great fanfare in late May 1968, problems 
surfaced almost as soon as the protest portion of the campaign began.  On May 20, Abernathy 
announced the possibility of a postponement of Solidarity Day, the showcase event of the 
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campaign, from May 30 to a later date to provide additional time for organizers.  In addition to a 
potential rescheduling of the campaign’s biggest event, tension between Resurrection City 
residents and the press began to surface during the campaign’s opening week.  Several of the 
city’s marshals attempted to bar members of the news media from entering the encampment.  
One marshal threatened a group of cameramen to leave unless they wanted to register to 
participate as city residents.  If the cameramen failed to heed his warning, the marshal vowed to 
“cut one of you” with a razorblade.61
      Although an SCLC staffer quickly overruled the marshals and allowed journalists to enter the 
city, the incident represented an early example of the struggle between SCLC organizers and 
Resurrection City marshals, some of whom engaged in acts of violence against city residents 
during their daily patrols of the encampment.  Years later, Abernathy characterized the unruly 
marshals as “an angry gang” of young black men from Chicago and Detroit who abused their 
position within the encampment.  Abernathy explained that, “To cope with them, we tried to use 
psychology and made a few of the leaders ‘marshals,’ though the only people who really needed 
disciplining were their own ranks.  But the stratagem didn’t work.  They continued to cause 
trouble, particularly at night when others were settling down and attempting to go to sleep.  So 
we had to ship them back home.  Unfortunately, we did not locate them all and they made 
trouble until the day we left.”
   
62
      The marshals’ harassment of reporters on the city’s opening day stunned many journalists 
who received favorable treatment from the SCLC during previous direct-action demonstrations.  
As Gerald McKnight notes, the marshals’ hostile behavior toward reporters put an unnecessary 
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strain on the relationship between the SCLC and a potentially powerful ally, “Most of the 
reporters assigned to the campaign were sympathetic to its goals and were shocked and mystified 
by strong-arm tactics that interfered with their efforts to get the story and meet their deadlines.”63
      In addition to the marshals’ volatile behavior toward the press and other Resurrection City 
residents, an unforeseen problem arose within the encampment in the form of inclement weather.  
Torrential downpours doused the encampment throughout the first full week, which resulted in 
muddy conditions resembling a swamp rather than a makeshift residential city.  Heavy rain on 
May 23 and consistent precipitation the next day forced a temporary evacuation of “about 100 to 
150” residents due to the resulting damages to their plywood homes.  On a mission to determine 
“the feasibility of donating heating units to cook food in the city’s kitchen,” Pat Brown, a former 
California governor, viewed the mud-covered community and recommended a full evacuation of 
the site.
 
64  In his autobiography, Abernathy reflected on how the rain hindered Resurrection City 
and the campaign throughout the encampment’s six-week existence, “It was one of the wettest 
springs in the history of the nation’s capital.  Day after day, the gray skies poured water, huge 
sheets that swept across the mall like the monsoons of India.  The first day or two, it was an 
adventure, sitting in the City Hall tent, listening to the persistent rapping of raindrops on the 
canvas.  But after a week the green grass that had provided us with a natural carpeting sank 
under our feet into soft mud.”65
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  Still, despite the unpleasant weather conditions, Resurrection 
City’s physical size combined with the tension that permeated the entire encampment remain 
fresh in the mind of Eddie Lee Webster Jr., a 16-year-old who traveled from his hometown of 
Marks, Mississippi on the mule train to participate in the campaign.  Reflecting on the 
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atmosphere at Resurrection City, Webster remarked that, “It was humongous and you had 
National Guard, state troopers and all.  Then, you had to be careful because you didn’t 
know…you walk outside Resurrection City, they might beat you and take you on to jail.”66
      While rain wreaked havoc on Resurrection City, Abernathy met with Bayard Rustin in New 
York to plan Solidarity Day.  Rustin organized the 1963 March on Washington in which an 
estimated 250,000 people filled the Washington Mall and listened to a variety of speakers, 
including King, who delivered his legendary “I Have A Dream,” address.   Beyond meeting 
Rustin in New York, Abernathy and other SCLC staffers stayed at the Pitts Motel at the start of 
the campaign, which rankled residents of Resurrection City forced to cope with the constant rain 
and thick mud.
 
67
      Yet the campaign suffered from problems that went beyond an unpredictable stretch of 
adverse weather.  A combination of confusion and dissension among SCLC’s leaders plagued the 
campaign throughout the first three weeks of Resurrection City.  For example, on May 31, less 
than two weeks after the protest phase of the campaign began, SCLC executive director Andrew 
Young announced the reassignment of Jesse Jackson from manager of Resurrection City to a 
new fundraising role in Chicago.  Hosea Williams took over Jackson’s old position of “city 
manager.”  Although Young described the personnel change as a simple “shifting of gears,” 
reporters perceived the move as a demotion for Jackson, the subject of a favorable profile in The 
New York Times just a week before his departure.
   
68
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      Within a week of Jackson’s exit from Washington, Bayard Rustin issued an ultimatum to 
Abernathy.  Speaking to reporters in New York on June 6, Rustin announced that, “Unless by 
noon tomorrow, negotiations begin to give me complete authority, then I’m out.”  Rustin’s 
frustration resulted from a dispute over the goals of the campaign.  In preparation for the 
Solidarity Day demonstration, Rustin issued a l4-point list of demands from SCLC to convey the 
organization’s goals for the campaign to Congress.  After Rustin issued his request through a 
statement on June 3, Williams labeled it “a lot of foolishness” and declared that the veteran civil 
rights organizer had “no business” releasing the statement.69  Rustin opted to appeal to 
Abernathy in attempt to clarify that he possessed total control over the planning and execution of 
Solidarity Day.  Without an assurance from Abernathy, Rustin claimed that he could not recruit 
the individuals and groups he needed to participate in the demonstration.70
      One day later, Rustin quit the campaign when Abernathy declined to provide him with the 
authority he sought.  Abernathy described the philosophical differences between SCLC officials 
and Rustin as “a minor misunderstanding over goals” and he insisted that, “There is no rift 
between us and there is not going to be any.”  Rustin also declined to publicly criticize 
Abernathy or SCLC. “Rev. Abernathy has not asked me to resign.  If my resignation can dispel 
discord that is harmful to our cause, I feel completely gratified.”  According to Abernathy, 
Rustin’s list did not include several of the campaign objectives, including a demand for the end 
of American involvement in the Vietnam War.
   
71
      While Abernathy contended that Rustin’s resignation represented a minor setback due to a 
slight disagreement between the organizer and SCLC’s staff, reporters characterized the loss of 
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Rustin as a major blow to the Solidarity Day march and the overall campaign.  Two days after 
Rustin’s resignation, Jean M. White reported “without Rustin there are fears that the June 19 
rally might end in a whimper.”  According to White, SCLC balked at Rustin’s request of 
authority and his attempt to “define their vague demands into what he considers realistic goals.”  
As a result, Abernathy’s decision revealed “SCLC, jealous of its ownership of the dream of 
Martin Luther King, has made it clear that it wants to keep full control of the Poor People’s 
Campaign.”72
      Ben A. Franklin echoed White’s sentiments in The New York Times.  Franklin asserted that, 
“Without Rustin, the June 19 march seems certain to fail, or at least to become something 
altogether different from the planned day when ‘the non-poor and the middle class do their 
thing,’ as S.C.L.C. officials used to call it.”  Franklin viewed the stubborn refusal of militant 
SCLC staffers to embrace “Rustin’s brand of old-line, respectable, highly organized, labor, 
church and academic liberalism” for the march as a gaffe with the potential to undermine the 
entire campaign.  He contended: “The outlook immediately grew dimmer both for the future of 
the Abernathy-King kind of nonviolent protest in general and for the Poor People’s campaign in 
particular.”
   
73
      When Ralph David Abernathy delivered his speech to conclude the Solidarity Day 
demonstration on June 19, only about twenty percent of the march’s estimated 50,000 
participants remained at the Washington Mall to hear his message.  Abernathy struck a defiant 
tone in his address as he proclaimed “We will not bow down to a racist Congress.  We will not 
bow down to an Administration that refuses to administrate to the nation the blessings of the 
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poor.  We will not bow down to the militarism and violence of this nation.  I don’t care what they 
do to me.  If I must join Robert Kennedy and Martin King, I still will not bow.”  He also 
referenced the 1963 March on Washington and characterized the civil rights legislation passed in 
the years between the two demonstrations as “broken promises.”74
      Abernathy’s speech capped an eventful day, which began with a one-mile march from the 
Washington Monument to the Lincoln Memorial and featured speeches by a host of civil and 
human rights leaders including NAACP executive director Roy Wilkins, UAW president Walter 
Reuther, National Urban League executive director Whitney Young and King’s widow, Coretta 
Scott King.  Given the fact that Solidarity Day took place in the same venue as the 1963 march 
and both demonstrations featured keynote addresses by SCLC’s president, many reporters and 
columnists offered comparisons regarding the two protests.  In addition to describing the smaller 
crowd size, journalists noted that the Solidarity Day participants conveyed a different mood than 
the hopeful spirit that underscored the earlier demonstration.  One NAACP official remarked that 
the casual attire worn by many marchers symbolized their anger and frustration with the 
economic and social inequality present throughout America: “Five years ago this thing was 
almost solidly middle class, and even the poor dressed their Sunday best.  Yet the country has 
failed to change, and there is disenchantment which affects them in so many ways.”
  
75
      William Raspberry, a black columnist with the Washington Post, declared that, “by the 
standard set on Aug. 28, 1963, Wednesday’s Solidarity Day affair was a pale thing.”  Raspberry 
noted the differences in behavior between the crowds at the two demonstrations, which he 
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viewed as a shift in mindset that occurred in the five-year gap between the protests.  According 
to Raspberry, “There were little things, like people not being quite as polite as they were five 
years ago when you could step on somebody’s foot and he’d smile and say, ‘Excuse me, please.’  
But mainly it was the mood of 1963 that was gone, and as a result, the endless speeches and 
songs and prayers, as good as some of them were, were little more than an all-day bore.”  
Raspberry did not blame Abernathy or Sterling Tucker, Rustin’s replacement as Solidarity Day 
coordinator, for what he viewed as a lackluster demonstration.  Instead, he depicted the 
demonstration as a microcosm of the entire campaign, “Nothing in particular went wrong 
Wednesday; it’s just that nothing happened.  Everybody knew nothing would happen, and 
everybody was powerless to do anything about it.”76
      On June 24, 1968, less than a week after Solidarity Day, the remaining residents of 
Resurrection City departed the encampment at the insistence of local police officers, who arrived 
to oversee the evacuation of the residential community following the expiration of SCLC’s 
permit the previous evening.  Police arrested Abernathy at the U.S. Capitol, where he marched 
along with close to three hundred followers to protest the closing of Resurrection City.  As the 
final residents vacated the encampment under the supervision of local police officers, Young 
conceded that the challenge of operating a makeshift residential community consisting of a 
diverse group of poor Americans took the focus away from the issues SCLC officials attempted 
to illuminate during the six-week campaign.  According to Young, “We got too bogged down in 
Resurrection City and wasted a lot of energy here.  In one sense, whoever it was that ran us out 
of there maybe did us a real favor.”
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      While Young expressed feelings of frustration and disappointment at the conclusion of the 
Poor People’s Campaign and journalists such as William Raspberry lamented the fact that 
“nothing happened” on Solidarity Day, Eddie Lee Webster Jr. believes the unity displayed by the 
crowd mattered as much as the campaign’s tangible goals.  According to Webster, singing along 
with the crowd delivered a powerful message of camaraderie that underscored the goals of the 
ordinary people that participated in the campaign, “That was the whole movement, you know.  
The song and what the words say, that was [what] the whole march was about.  It wasn’t about 
just being poor or whatever.  It was about standing up and not letting nobody turn you around or 
whatever.  It was about the will to accomplish something and that’s what most people liked 
about it.”78
      The Poor People’s Campaign exposed the weaknesses of SCLC and foreshadowed the 
struggles that Abernathy and the organization would encounter in the ensuing decade.  The 
dissension among the organization’s leaders did not disappear after the conclusion of the 
campaign.  Jesse Jackson continued to create problems for Abernathy and SCLC’s board of 
directors in his role as director of Operation Breadbasket, the organization’s economic and 
fundraising arm, before he resigned in a public split at the end of 1971.  As Solidarity Day 
demonstrated, the use of nonviolent protest, which worked well in desegregation campaigns 
during the 1960s, proved ineffective in combating the more complex issue of economic 
inequality in the 1970s.  Hence, civil rights activists such as Young opted to pursue public office 
because they believed politics represented the most effective method of utilizing nonviolence to 
enact meaningful social and economic change.  King told Abernathy that “you are the only one 
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who could keep the team together,” in the event of his death.  However, the team remained loyal 
to King, despite the fact that Abernathy pushed for the same goals King outlined for the 
campaign.79
      Furthermore, as historian Nick Kotz observed, in the months preceding his death, King 
displayed public contempt for Lyndon Johnson, which resulted in an open feud between the two 
men.  A fundamental disagreement over the fate of antipoverty programs drove a wedge between 
the men who worked together just a few years earlier on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
1965 Voting Rights Act.  King believed Johnson should withdraw American troops from 
Vietnam and increase federal funding for social programs designed to help the poor.  As a lame-
duck president with declining approval ratings, Johnson had little incentive to work with 
Abernathy, King’s closest associate and hand-picked successor.
  
80
      Of course, Abernathy also committed some major mistakes during the campaign.  The 
inability to compromise with Rustin and keep him onboard damaged the credibility of the 
campaign in the eyes of the press before Solidarity Day took place.  Moreover, the fact that 
Solidarity Day failed to resonate with federal government officials and journalists indicated that 
the SCLC needed to revamp its strategy of spurring the government into passing legislation to 
assist impoverished Americans.  As Raspberry observed in his analysis of Solidarity Day, “What 
Wednesday taught us, perhaps, is that the day of the demonstration as an effective civil rights 
tool is over, that there can never be another Aug. 28, 1963.”
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, SCLC, AND THE CHARLESTON HOSPITAL 
WORKERS’ STRIKE 
 
 
      On April 26, 1969, Ralph David Abernathy composed a letter from his cell in the Charleston 
County Jail.  A year removed from his ascension to the presidency of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC) following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., Abernathy 
borrowed a tactic his predecessor employed in Birmingham six years earlier.  The letter served as 
Abernathy’s response to a paid advertisement in the Charleston News and Courier in which a 
group of 59 citizens urged the Concerned Clergy Committee to withdraw its support of the black 
hospital workers’ strike against the Medical College of South Carolina (MCH) and the 
Charleston County Hospital.  In addition to refuting several of the group’s assertions against the 
strikers, Abernathy outlined the strikers’ goal: “We will teach until South Carolina recognizes 
the rights of its poor to organize and accept Local 1199B as the official bargaining agent for the 
non-professional workers in Charleston’s county and University Hospitals.”82
      By the late 1960s, a significant shift had occurred in the objectives of SCLC.  Following the 
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the organization set its 
sights on improving the economic conditions of African Americans in urban communities.  
When King arrived in Chicago in 1966 to lead a campaign aimed at narrowing the income gap 
between the city’s black residents and their white counterparts, SCLC’s senior staff members 
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quickly realized that poverty represented the next obstacle facing African Americans in their 
quest for equality. 
      Abernathy recalled encountering the stark reality of this challenge during an early visit to 
Chicago with King, “By this time we realized that although we had won the legal right to check 
into any hotel in the country, we still had problems checking out, because we didn’t have the 
money to pay.  In large measure that was the problem with the blacks living in Chicago.  They 
didn’t have the money to buy their way out of the squalor and degradation that surrounded 
them.”83  By December 1967, King began to plan a Poor People’s Campaign with the intent of 
generating awareness of the millions of Americans living in poverty.  King hired Bernard 
Lafayette, a founder of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to the position of 
program director for the SCLC and instructed him to begin organizing the venture.84
      In the wake of the Resurrection City failure, Andrew Young, the SCLC’s executive vice 
president, sought to rectify the growing friction within the organization’s senior staff by 
scheduling a multi-day meeting in which a pair of psychiatrists observed and analyzed the issues 
of contention.
  The 
assassination of King in the spring of 1968 thrust Abernathy into the spotlight as the new SCLC 
president.   
85
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  Although the group therapy session helped clear the air among SCLC’s top 
officials, the organization still lacked consensus on leadership and direction.  King’s death 
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Abernathy, Young, and Jesse Jackson each appealed to different factions of rank-and-file civil 
rights supporters.86
      For Abernathy and SCLC, the Charleston strike forced the organization to move past the 
failure of Resurrection City.  It allowed a civil rights organization that seemed listless to regroup 
and focus on a new campaign similar to the successful direct-action movements of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, such as the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Selma-to-Montgomery voting 
rights march.  Years later, Young contended that Charleston “was almost made-to-order as a 
focus for the energies of an SCLC staff embroiled in the intrigue of succession.  In contrast to the 
Poor Peoples’ Campaign, the strike by Charleston hospital workers in the spring of 1969 had 
clearly defined and achievable goals.”
   
87
      The issue historians encounter when analyzing the Charleston hospital workers’ strike 
involves the outcome of the campaign.  Did the striking workers as well as the two national 
organizations that led the movement, SCLC and Local 1199, the Retail, Wholesale, and 
Department Store Workers Union gain the rights and benefits they sought?  The answer to this 
question varies depending on the group and the historian analyzing each group.  For instance, 
labor historians Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg concluded that the strike did not result in a clear 
victory for either Local 1199, whose national leaders hoped to establish a strong affiliate of 
unionized hospital workers in the city, or SCLC, whose leaders failed to mount any successful 
national civil rights campaigns after Charleston.   
 
      Yet despite these setbacks, Fink and Greenburg noted that both organizations did accomplish 
some of their goals.  For SCLC, the strike ushered in a new era of political participation within 
Charleston’s black community that featured a surge in black voter registration and the election of 
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several African Americans to state and municipal public office.  For example, in 1970, 
Charleston’s Herbert U. Fielding became the first black citizen elected to the South Carolina 
State House of Representatives since Reconstruction.88  Historian Steve Estes also contends that 
the strike illuminated the value of political power to Charleston’s black community, which 
resulted in a dramatic increase in voter registration and turnout for local elections.89
      Local 1199 increased efforts for unionization in hospitals throughout the North in the wake 
of the Charleston campaign.  In one instance, a Baltimore hospital agreed to extend union 
recognition to Local 1199 merely to avoid the possibility of a prolonged hospital workers’ strike 
similar to the Charleston movement.  Working alongside SCLC in Charleston also helped the 
hospital union enhance its image as a supportive partner in the civil rights struggle.
 
90
      While Fink and Greenberg assessed the role Local 1199 played in the campaign, Adam 
Fairclough analyzed the Charleston strike strictly in terms of the SCLC’s participation.  After 
describing several of the SCLC’s victories in smaller scale campaigns involving school 
desegregation and voting rights in Alabama, Fairclough labeled the strike as SCLC’s “most 
impressive achievement” during the period from 1968-1971.
 
91 Christopher P. Lehman also 
described the Charleston strike as a success for SCLC.  Lehman viewed the participation of 
prominent politicians such as Michigan congressmen John Conyers and Charles Diggs in 
SCLC’s Mother’s Day rally on May 11 as an endorsement of Abernathy’s leadership of the civil 
rights organization.92
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George Schulz, the U. S. Labor Secretary, and Leon Panetta, Director of the Civil Rights 
Division of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, shortly after the strike’s 
conclusion as positive developments for Abernathy and SCLC.93
      By contrast, I argue that it was the most significant event in Abernathy’s long career as a 
civil rights activist.  The Charleston strike took place at a critical time for SCLC.  The 
organization’s transition to antipoverty campaigns began under King’s leadership and Abernathy 
sought to build on his predecessor’s quest for economic equality.  In the wake of Resurrection 
City, the Charleston strike represented an opportunity for Abernathy to solidify his position as 
the SCLC’s leader and carry the civil rights movement into a new decade with a different goal 
than the campaigns for voting rights and legal access to public facilities. When Abernathy 
accepted the invitation from Local 1199 to join the strike, SCLC became engaged in a campaign 
for clear economic objectives and an effort to transform the method of nonviolent direct-action 
protest into a truly “long” civil rights movement.
 
94
      On March 22, 1969, Mary Moultrie, the leader of a group of a dozen hospital workers who 
lost their jobs at the MCH following an attempt to unionize, sent a telegram to Abernathy. In her 
telegram, Moultrie alerted the civil rights leader to the conditions the strikers faced from the 
Charleston police department and the state-owned hospital’s hostile administration, “There have 
been over twenty arrests in the last 3 days, and the viciousness of the police is steadily 
escalating. The beatings and manhandling of black women must be brought to a stop. The anti-
union terror campaign in Charleston must halt.”
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      After Moultrie and her co-workers initiated the strike on March 20, SCLC quickly joined the 
campaign, which also included Local 1199. The strike represented an opportunity for the two 
organizations to achieve their individual goals by working together.  For 1199, the strike 
provided a chance to determine the feasibility of unionizing in South Carolina, a state with a 
formidable anti-union business and political structure.  For SCLC, the Charleston campaign 
served as a chance to revive their efforts at waging a successful crusade against poverty in the 
wake of the Resurrection City failure the previous summer.  Moreover, due to the fact that some 
local residents such as Dave Livingston, a white man who recruited black hospital workers in 
Charleston for Local 1199, viewed the city’s daily newspaper, the News and Courier, as 
“probably the most conservative newspaper in the state,” the fledgling union needed SCLC’s 
presence to attract national media coverage of their struggle.96
      In the immediate aftermath of the 113-day strike, Abernathy labeled the strike as “the 
outstanding achievement of this year” for SCLC and that its outcome “is a beacon of light” for 
the working poor.
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  If the Charleston campaign ended in a significant triumph for SCLC and the 
civil rights movement, as Abernathy and other SCLC participants such as Jack O’Dell declared, 
one must identify any gains the hospital workers and African Americans achieved. According to 
Young, “the key demands in the strike were: (1) union recognition, (2) an end of racial 
discrimination in wages and hiring, and (3) rehiring of the twelve fired workers.”  By the time 
the strike concluded, state and hospital officials met all three of these demands.  Yet hospital 
administrators gradually eliminated the workers’ collective bargaining rights and the hospital 
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remains a union-free workplace today.  As a result, the strike failed to provide all of the 
economic and workplace benefits sought by its participants.98
      Just over a week after Moultrie’s telegram to the SCLC leaders, Abernathy and Young 
traveled to Charleston for the first of many lengthy visits during the course of the campaign in 
the spring and summer.  Speaking to a crowd of 1,500 at Fourth Baptist Church, Abernathy 
stressed the reason for his trip, “I have come to Charleston on the invitation of the local leaders 
and the hospital workers who are seeking to be organized into a bargaining force and lift the 
level of economic plight in this city.”
    
99  Within two weeks of Abernathy’s first speech in 
Charleston, SCLC’s involvement in organizing the strike escalated.  In a letter to Esau Jenkins, a 
local activist who participated in a variety of civil rights causes in Charleston throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, Abernathy mentioned “a strong desire on the part of the staff for the 1969 
SCLC Convention to be held in Charleston, South Carolina.”100
      By the time Abernathy returned to Charleston on April 21, the national media coverage Local 
1199B craved materialized in the form of an article in The New York Times.  The article 
described a joint statement of unanimous support for the strike from fourteen of the nation’s 
most prominent civil rights leaders, including Coretta Scott King, NAACP executive secretary 
Roy Wilkins, Negro American Labor Council president A. Phillip Randolph, and National Urban 
League executive director Whitney M. Young Jr.
          
101
                                                          
98 Young, An Easy Burden, 498. 
  The statement resonated with reporters 
since it was the first public display of unity among different civil rights organizations since the 
assassination of King.  Three days after the story appeared, James A. Wechsler echoed a similar 
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sentiment in his column in the New York Post.  Under the headline “A Clear Cause,” Wechsler 
wrote that the strike “has already produced one momentous national result. It has reunited civil 
rights groups that had been mired in fruitless combat over “‘separatism’” and related issues.”  
Wechsler also admitted that at the outset of the strike, he doubted it would gain national media 
attention since it “could be so absent-mindedly dismissed as a ‘local South Carolina story.’”102
      In addition to the growing interest from media outlets outside of South Carolina, additional 
workers joined the cause as eighty employees of the Charleston County Hospital went on strike 
on March 28, eight days after Moultrie and the MCH employees left their jobs.  The following 
day, the Concerned Clergy Committee issued a proposal to resolve the strike.  The “Peace With 
Justice Proposal,” a document signed by thirty-four clergymen, featured several specific requests 
from the ministers that they believed would expedite the process of reaching a settlement.  They 
called for “an impartially supervised election of workers in the non-professional category.” The 
elected workers “should be empowered to deal with management and also be recognized as 
spokesmen for the workers.”  Following the installation of the elected committee, the proposal 
stated that the workers should return to their jobs and refrain from further “agitation at work.”  
Conversely, the clergymen urged the administration of the two hospitals “to reinstate all workers 
who have been discharged and to drop all charges against the workers which have arisen in this 
present strife.”
 
103
      Although the striking workers succeeded in gaining support from national civil rights 
organizations, attracting attention from national newspapers and magazines, and earning a 
blessing to unionize from local clergymen, hospital administrators denied the employees’ request 
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for a peaceful settlement.  Instead, senior hospital and government officials, such as Governor 
Robert E. McNair and MCH president William M. McCord, refused to budge.  In response to the 
Concerned Clergy Committee’s request for a diplomatic resolution to the impasse, McCord, who 
frequently displayed a paternalistic attitude toward the hospital’s black employees, equated the 
strike with an attack against the hospital’s patients.104  Addressing a press conference days after 
the clergymen issued their proposal and Abernathy’s speech at Fourth Baptist Church, McCord 
succinctly stated that “a strike against the hospital is a strike against the patients.”  He added that 
“we cannot sanction lawlessness,” and the proposal’s call for reinstatement of all the striking 
workers would force the hospital to bring back “12 persons who were fired for completely 
disregarding patient care.”105
      While McCord refused to entertain any proposal that allowed the striking workers to return to 
their jobs, McNair cited state law as the obstacle preventing a settlement with the union.  He 
informed the media of a law which barred state institutions, including the hospital, from 
negotiating with union employees.  According to McNair, if MCH officials opened negotiations 
with the union, it would set a precedent that could result in collective bargaining with union 
employees at other state-owned hospitals.
 
106
      The strike intensified in late April when Abernathy led a morning march of 2,500 protesters 
to the Medical College.  When Abernathy and his supporters returned to the complex in the 
evening, Charleston police officers arrested the SCLC president and 101 of his fellow marchers 
for violating an injunction that limited the size of picket lines.  Although Abernathy wrote the 
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letter on April 26, the public did not learn of his note until six days later when it ran as a paid 
advertisement in the News and Courier.107
      By the time Charleston’s citizens read Abernathy’s letter in their morning newspapers, 
Coretta Scott King had arrived to lend her support to SCLC and the striking hospital workers.  
Wearing a Local 1199 paper hat and a pair of sunglasses, she marched alongside hospital 
workers to the Medical College on April 30.  On May 1, King appeared in a full-page 
advertisement in The New York Times.  Along with a photo of a stoic King, the ad consisted of a 
letter in which she implored readers to support the Charleston strike and “send the largest 
contribution you can.”  In addition, she wrote that with a victory for the hospital workers, 
“Charleston can become that moment in our history when the unity of black and white, of the 
civil rights movement with organized labor, may be regained.”  In large bold letters, the words 
“If my husband were alive today…he would be in Charleston, South Carolina!” flanked the 
beginning and end of King’s letter.
 
108  Although she did not hold an official position with any 
civil rights organization, King’s support solidified SCLC’s credibility with other national civil 
rights groups and Charleston’s black citizens, whom she addressed later in the month at a rally 
that attracted more than 2,000 people.109
      While the striking hospital workers mobilized behind Abernathy and followed him directly to 
the Charleston County Jail and Coretta Scott King’s presence encouraged the strike’s supporters, 
state and local political officials pushed back against the daily marches.  Governor Robert E. 
McNair issued a state of emergency on May 1 and instituted a 9 p.m.-5 a.m. curfew for the city 
of Charleston and a portion of North Charleston.  The curfew attempted to “cool down” the 
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atmosphere, which McNair believed had grown uncomfortably tense with “widespread acts of 
violence and threats of violence, common disregard for the law, and disorders of a general 
nature.”  Stewart R. King and Jack Roach, the News and Courier reporters who covered 
McNair’s press conference noted that the governor’s declaration and SCLC’s unwillingness to 
depart Charleston until the hospitals agreed to meet the strikers’ demands resulted in an 
untenable stalemate between the two opposing sides.  The reporters described the situation in 
Charleston at the outset of May, “So it comes down to a battle of wills and cold nerve in a 
powder magazine of emotion.  No one can predict the winner.  But Charleston clearly is the 
almost certain loser.”110
      By the time McNair announced the mandatory curfew, the Charleston strike had generated 
editorials from newspapers outside the Palmetto State.  Outsiders viewed McNair’s 
unwillingness to negotiate with the striking hospital workers, officials from Local 1199 and 
SCLC as a poor strategic decision which might ultimately trigger a violent outcome similar to 
the sanitation workers’ strike in Memphis just a year earlier.  An April 30 editorial in the 
Washington Post noted the similarities between Memphis and Charleston, “The authorities have 
refused to meet with the union, insisting that wages and working conditions of public employes 
[sic] are set by law and therefore not negotiable.  Memphis held a similar hard-headed position 
before Dr. King’s murder, but backed down afterward, spurred on by the tragedy and Federal 
intervention at the request of President Johnson.”
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President Nixon to dispatch officials from either the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
or the Labor Department to Charleston in an effort to broker a settlement.112
      One day later, in a message that echoed the Post, members of the Charlotte Observer’s 
editorial board weighed in on the strike.  From the opening paragraph, the editorial served as a 
rebuke of McNair, McCord, and the Charleston officials, “Official reaction to the Charleston, 
S.C., hospital strike becomes more and more a case study in the wrong way to handle an 
explosive labor-civil rights situation.”
 
113 The newspaper chastised the hospital and state officials 
for failing “to recognize the potency” of the hospital workers’ cause, which “is ready made for 
poor blacks—and indeed, poor whites—to rally around.”114
      Similar to the column that ran in the Post a day earlier, the Observer warned of the 
consequences that awaited Charleston’s local officials if they continued to stubbornly refuse to 
negotiate with the striking workers, SCLC, and Local 1199:  
 
With each passing day, it becomes politically and practically more difficult to 
break the Charleston impasse.  But costly as it might be for hospital leaders to 
admit the bankruptcy of their original tactics or, barring that, for Gov. Robert 
McNair to take them off the hook by stepping in, such belated leadership would 
be far cheaper than leaving a settlement to come after the sobering violence that 
could make Charleston another Memphis or another Orangeburg.115
 
  
Although prominent out-of-state newspapers openly criticized the inaction of hospital 
management and state officials, McNair, perhaps emboldened by the support of the News and 
Courier and a host of other South Carolina newspapers, maintained his position that the state 
would not bargain with representatives of the striking workers.  Editorials from other newspapers 
around the state began to appear on the News and Courier opinion pages. On May 4, three days 
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after McNair imposed the city-wide curfew, the Greenville News announced support for the 
governor’s position in an editorial, “The struggle in Charleston may be long and bitter with the 
ever present danger of major violence.  But the stakes are enormous; the welfare of every South 
Carolina citizen is bound up in the outcome…The position taken by the governor and the 
General Assembly is that of the people of this state.  Let that position be expressed in no 
uncertain terms.”116  Five days later, the Charleston newspaper published an editorial from The 
State, Columbia’s daily newspaper, which supported McNair’s stance against granting collective 
bargaining rights to public employees.  According to the State, “He (McNair) simply cannot 
allow the non-professional employees of the state and municipal hospitals at Charleston to be 
represented by a union.  That could easily open the floodgates.  Other publicly operated hospitals 
all over the state could easily topple into the union lair.  And then perhaps government clerical 
workers, policemen, firemen, teachers, garbagemen and what have you would get swept up in the 
union movement.”117  The News and Courier also published similar editorials of support for 
McNair from the Spartanburg Herald and the Anderson Independent in the first ten days after 
the governor imposed the curfew.118
      With the curfew in effect through the first ten days of May, Charleston emerged as “the 
almost certain loser”
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evening.  Business at the city’s downtown Holiday Inn, which was forced to cancel “all of our 
evening functions,” dropped precipitously with revenues falling from “around $900 a day to 
$415 a day,” according to a hotel spokesman.120 Another hotel manager estimated that the 
curfew had cost his business between $30,000 and $40,000 in lost revenue from conventions 
since approximately 2,000 guests canceled their reservations following McNair’s announcement.  
Even businesses outside the curfew zone, such as Ashley Lanes, a bowling alley located beyond 
the city limits, struggled to attract customers in the evening hours.  According to Johnny Howe, 
the alley’s operator, regular bowling leagues canceled their weekly appointments and revenues 
after 9 p.m. dipped below $10 on average.  Howe explained the dire financial predicament facing 
his business as a result of the curfew, “I’m not even doing enough to pay the light bill.  If this 
thing continues, we’re going to have to close our doors before long.”121
      Abernathy and SCLC refused to wait while McNair, McCord, and other local officials 
declined to negotiate with the striking workers.  The civil rights group organized “The National 
Mother’s Day Poor People’s March,” in order to generate support of the hospital workers.
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The event began with entertainment provided by the Operation Breadbasket Band at 2 p.m. on 
May 11 and consisted of nearly four hours of songs and speeches a rally prior to the march itself.  
Accounts vary regarding the exact number of participants that joined Abernathy, Moultrie, and 
the hospital workers for the three-mile march from County Hall on King Street through 
downtown and past the city’s hospitals.  According to John Kifner, the freelance reporter who 
covered the event for The New York Times, 12,000 individuals marched alongside Abernathy 
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through the streets of Charleston.123  The News and Courier, citing two law enforcement 
officials, including Charleston Police Chief John Conroy, estimated the crowd of marchers at 
“more than 5,000 persons.”124
      Despite the discrepancy, the march represented a significant achievement for the strike’s 
participants and organizers in the midst of the two-month standoff.  Several prominent 
politicians, including five members of the U.S. House Representatives, John Conyers Jr. (D-MI), 
Charles Diggs Jr. (D-MI), Ed Koch (D-NY), Allard Lowenstein (D-NY), and  William F. Ryan 
(D-NY) marched with the striking workers.  Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile 
Workers, joined the marchers, presented a $10,000 check to Local 1199, and vowed to contribute 
$500 per week to SCLC throughout the strike’s duration.
  
125
      Emboldened by the success of the Mother’s Day march, Abernathy departed Charleston later 
that evening to attend a May 13 meeting with President Nixon and the Urban Affairs Council to 
discuss the nation’s poverty problem.  The meeting left Abernathy and his acolytes as well as 
Nixon and his cabinet officials and aides wary of forming any kind of alliance with each other to 
address the poverty issue.  Nixon’s staff took offense at the manner in which Abernathy 
criticized the administration for their lack of attention to the plight of the nation’s poor, many of 
whom were African Americans.  At one point in the meeting Abernathy offered a particularly 
insulting comment on his initial lack of confidence regarding the level of assistance the Nixon 
White House might provide the poor people SCLC represented: “Let history show that this 
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Administration, of which little was expected, was the one which made America truly keep its 
long deferred promise to all of its citizens.”126
      Abernathy’s opening comment, coupled with a list of demands that he directed at the 
Administration on issues ranging from assistance with the Charleston strike to $2.5 billion in 
annual funding for a food program, did not sit well with Nixon or his aides.  R. K. Price Jr., one 
of Nixon’s speechwriters, believed Abernathy’s tone cost the poor people he claimed to 
champion.  In front of an audience consisting of Nixon, the Urban Affairs Council and several 
members of the president’s cabinet, Abernathy, in Price’s estimation, had “wasted its time with 
posturing, attitudinizing, sermonizing, and with pleading and wheedling directed not at the 
problems of poverty, but at the requirements of his own brand of confrontation politics.” 
 
127  The 
meeting frustrated Nixon as well.  In the wake of Abernathy’s description of a “disappointing 
and fruitless” summit in his remarks to reporters, Nixon jotted a brief note to John Ehrlichman 
and H.R. Haldeman, two of his senior advisers who arranged the meeting, “E-H, This shows that 
my judgment about not seeing such people is right.  No More of This!”128
      When Abernathy reflected on the strike and his meeting with Nixon and the Urban Affairs 
Council two decades later, he contended that the president’s refusal to intervene in the impasse 
indicated a lack of concern for the working poor.  As Abernathy saw it,  
 
It was ironic that I should be invited there to consider the plight of the poor only a 
few days after I had unsuccessfully appealed to this same president for help in 
securing higher wages for the Charleston hospital workers.  Had he really cared 
about the poor, he might have used the prestige of his office to help settle the 
strike.  I certainly didn’t expect him to initiate national legislation, but a few 
supportive words would have meant a great deal at that moment.  Instead, he 
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ignored my pleas, then welcomed me at the White House later as if I had never 
asked for his help.129
 
 
Abernathy chalked up the harsh remarks he delivered in a press conference immediately 
following the meeting to the frustration he experienced while listening to assurances from White 
House officials vowing to reduce poverty while strikers continued to march in Charleston with 
the hope of improving upon their $1.30 per hour salaries.130
      Two days after Abernathy failed to persuade Nixon to intervene in the strike, a bipartisan 
group of U.S. Senators issued the same request to the president.  In a letter to Nixon, the group of 
17 senators, led by Jacob K. Javits (R-NY) and Walter F. Mondale (D-MN), implored the 
president to arrange for a federal mediator to help broker a settlement between the striking 
workers and state officials.  The senators warned the president that any failure to resolve the 
strike in a nonviolent manner might lead Americans to abandon this concept as a method of 
settling disputes, “The Charleston strike is a test of the principle of nonviolence at a time when 
many in America are losing faith in that principle as a strategy for social change.”
 
131
      The letter to Nixon failed to sway Gov. McNair, who offered an immediate rebuttal to the 
concerned senators.  Wary at the prospect that Nixon might actually heed the senators’ request 
and send a federal mediator to negotiate a settlement, McNair opined that he considered it “quite 
strange” that the senators chose to endorse the strikers’ “open and willful violation” of South 
Carolina law.  Instead of advocating for federal intervention, McNair thought the senators would 
be “much more helpful if they would issue a call for public respect for the law and for placing 
the care of the ill above selfish personal interests.”
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      Nixon ignored the senators’ request for the appointment of a federal mediator to intervene in 
the strike despite the fact that his immediate predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, utilized the same 
strategy to settle the sanitation workers’ strike in Memphis the previous spring.  In spite of his 
dislike for King in the months preceding the Poor People’s Campaign, Johnson and his 
administration did not ignore the participants at Resurrection City.  During the early weeks of the 
encampment, Vice President Hubert Humphrey visited the tent city alongside three mayors, John 
Lindsay of New York City, Atlanta’s Ivan Allen Jr., and Walter E. Washington, the African 
American mayor of Washington D.C.  Humphrey, then in the midst of a presidential campaign, 
publicly endorsed the campaign, “We in public office want to show our concern, on the one 
hand, and to indicate the concern of all the American people, both black and white, for the plight 
of the poor.  You’re dramatizing to the American people the need of their fellow Americans who 
are poor.  This can be a very helpful educational experience.”133
      With both sides holding firm in their respective positions and no prospect for federal 
intervention, Abernathy and his SCLC colleagues continued to organize marches and rallies.  On 
Thursday May 29, the day before Memorial Day weekend, Coretta Scott King returned to 
Charleston and joined Abernathy and Moultrie at an evening rally at Stoney Field, a local 
football stadium.  Like the Mother’s Day march several weeks earlier, the size of the crowd 
varied depending on the source.  According to the Charleston News and Courier, the crowd 
  One year later, Abernathy and 
SCLC discovered that Nixon, who received significant support from the South’s white 
conservatives in the 1968 election, would not extend any public endorsements of civil rights 
demonstrations.  As a result, the dawn of the 1970s presented a formidable political challenge for 
Abernathy and SCLC.  
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numbered “more than 2,000 people.”134  The New York Times reported the crowd consisted of 
“more than 4,500 exuberant Negroes.”135
      The event featured a triumphant tone despite the fact that local government officials 
remained steadfast in their refusal to negotiate with the strikers.  King read a telegram of support 
for the striking workers from Ethel Kennedy, the widow of former Sen. Robert F. Kennedy.  
After questioning the collective inaction of the federal government, which she believed should 
have threatened to withhold funding from the Medical College Hospital, King told the workers in 
attendance that their efforts resonated with people throughout the nation, “For what began as a 
little known strike by black hospital workers has captured the imagination and touched the 
conscience of millions of Americans.  The truth is that you are making history in Charleston.”
 
136 
When Moultrie, one of the original dozen employees fired by the hospital more than two months 
earlier, spoke to the crowd she directed her ire at McNair, “Mr. Governor, we’ve got something 
that you’ll just never be able to beat.  Not you, nor your cops, nor your National Guard.  Because 
Mr. Governor, we’ve got a winning combination (Local 1199B and the SCLC).”137
      Abernathy’s message lacked the dramatic rhetoric present in the speeches delivered by King 
and Moultrie.  The SCLC president reassured the crowd that his organization remained 
committed to stay in Charleston for the duration of the strike, no matter how long it took for the 
workers to receive an acceptable settlement from hospital officials, “I’ll tarry here awhile.  It 
might just be I’ll bring the SCLC conference in August to Charleston…the program committee 
already has made the recommendation.”
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      At the start of June, the possibility of a settlement between hospital management and the 
striking workers appeared imminent.  On June 2, McNair retracted the city’s curfew following 32 
days of enforcement.  Although he previously shortened the curfew twice, first from its original 
eight-hour period (9 p.m.-5 a.m.) to a six-hour time frame (11 p.m.-5 a.m.) and subsequently to a 
five-hour slot (midnight-5 a.m.), McNair waited until the conclusion of a relatively quiet 
Memorial Day weekend before abolishing it altogether.139
      Three days after McNair lifted the curfew and exactly one week after Coretta Scott King 
spoke at the Charleston rally, she finally received a definitive answer to the question she posited 
regarding the U. S. government’s willingness to support the Medical College of South Carolina 
through federal funding.  In a June 5 letter to Dr. McCord, Hugh A. Brimm, a regional 
compliance officer with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), ordered the 
hospital to re-hire the dozen workers who lost their jobs while attempting to unionize two 
months earlier.  The letter represented the culmination of an 11-month investigation, in which 
HEW officials determined the hospital failed to comply with civil rights regulations.  If the 
workers were not immediately restored to their previous positions with back pay, the hospital 
would lose an estimated $12 million in federal funding.
 
140
      Later that day, a meeting between the MCH board of trustees and a group representing the 
hospital workers produced a settlement.  McNair approved the preliminary proposals on June 10 
and the lengthy strike appeared destined for a peaceful conclusion following months of strife and 
turmoil.
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  In a startling turn of events, McCord withdrew the settlement offer on June 13.  Two 
of South Carolina’s biggest political heavyweights, U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond (R) and Rep. 
L. Mendel Rivers (D), chairman of the House Armed Services committee and a staunch 
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segregationist, met separately with HEW Secretary Robert H. Finch on June 12.  Collectively, 
the two legislators convinced Finch to examine the hospital to determine the accuracy of the non-
compliance charges.  In his public comments, Thurmond depicted the issue as a local personnel 
matter to Billy E. Bowles, the Washington bureau reporter for the News and Courier.  
“Ultimately,” he told Bowles, “any decision about the rehiring of the 12 employes [sic] in 
question should rest with appropriate officials of the state and the Medical College of South 
Carolina, not with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.”142
      Frustrated by the sudden withdrawal of a settlement offer, Abernathy and Hosea Williams, a 
longtime SCLC staff member, attempted to lead a march of 300 supporters on the night of June 
20.  Charleston Police Chief John F. Conroy arrested the pair and their supporters reacted 
violently by throwing “bricks, bottles, and other missiles” at police and members of the South 
Carolina National Guard.  Due to the violent outburst, which neither Abernathy nor Williams 
instigated, both men were charged with “inciting to riot,” a felony with bail set at $50,000 
each.
 
143
      With Abernathy in jail, the level of violence on the streets of Charleston increased, including 
frequent attacks on police officers and “nightly cases of arson,” despite SCLC’s consistent 
requests for the strikers to engage in nonviolent protests.
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  As a result, the Nixon 
Administration dispatched William Pierce, a federal mediator, to Charleston to negotiate a 
settlement on June 24.  Three days later, McCord agreed to a settlement that included the 
rehiring of the twelve workers, whose employment status with MCH persisted as a sticking point 
throughout the strike.  The settlement also provided salary increases for the non-professional 
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workers, the installation of a grievance process, and an employees’ credit union with voluntary 
dues.145
      While McCord’s decision to settle with the striking MCH workers pleased Abernathy, he 
elected to stay in jail until the local officials who operated the Charleston County Hospital 
agreed to rehire all of their striking employees.  On July 3, Abernathy walked out of his jail cell 
to return to Atlanta, a little over two weeks before the remaining strikers reached a settlement 
with the county hospital.
 
146  As he left Charleston, Abernathy promised supporters he would 
return shortly.  According to one of his SCLC colleagues, Abernathy would return “to do one of 
two things—celebrate or demonstrate.”147
      The celebration that accompanied the peaceful resolution of the 113-day Charleston hospital 
strike ended more quickly than many of its organizers envisioned.  MCH officials gradually 
eliminated the grievance procedure and employees’ credit union, the two key elements sought by 
Moultrie and her Local 1199B colleagues.  Without these components in place, hospital workers 
essentially lacked collective bargaining rights as well as the funds and attention to mount another 
attempt at unionization.
 
148  Yet the workers’ salary increase, which now matched the federal 
minimum wage, and the rise in political participation within the city’s black community served 
as clear victories for the strikers.  Years later, Moultrie recalled that as a result of the strike, 
“People woke up to the fact that they needed to get out and vote.”149
      The four-month strike exacted a heavy toll on Abernathy and SCLC.  The physical and 
mental demands of initiating and participating in nonviolent direct-action civil rights campaigns 
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for more than a decade caught up to the organization’s senior staff members.  In a December 
1969 interview with New York Times correspondent James T. Wooten, Andrew Young 
commented on the group’s dire condition. “We’re not healthy,” he said.  “We’re an exhausted 
organization right now.”150  Young also admitted that SCLC was “not really strong enough to 
take on any national issues like Birmingham or Selma.”151
      Shortly after Wooten’s story ran in the Times’ December 25 edition, Young resigned from 
his position as SCLC’s executive vice president in order to pursue a political career.  Deprived of 
its top administrator—Young had taken part in all of the negotiations in Charleston—and with 
donors sending their discretionary income to Coretta Scott King for her ongoing project to 
construct a memorial center to honor her late husband, Abernathy presided over an organization 
plagued by a lack of resources and a dearth of meaningful campaigns to launch.  By 1973, just 
four years after the Charleston strike, SCLC, which once consisted of 125 staff members, was 
left with just 17 employees.
 
152
      Despite the SCLC’s gradual decline and the failure for both the civil rights organization and 
Local 1199 to build on the momentum created by the fusion of “union power and soul power,” 
the strike represented a departure from the setbacks suffered by SCLC in Chicago in 1966 and in 
Resurrection City in 1968.
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successful nonviolent direct-action campaign without the planning, organization, and leadership 
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and Abernathy served as SCLC president for seven years following the strike. 
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     Charleston served as a culmination to the nonviolent direct-action campaigns that 
characterized the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s.  As the 1970s arrived, veterans 
of the nonviolent campaigns turned to political office as a means to continue their quest for 
human rights and equality of opportunity.  In addition to Young, who served two terms in 
Congress before representing America as the nation’s first black U.N. Ambassador and serving 
two terms as Mayor of Atlanta, former SNCC chairman John Lewis won a seat in Congress in 
1986 and remains an active member of the House of Representatives and former SNCC co-
founder Julian Bond served six terms in the Georgia State Legislature from the mid-sixties to the 
mid-eighties.  Even Abernathy sought political office.  He ran for the congressional seat Young 
vacated after accepting the U.N. ambassadorship in 1977.  More importantly, though the success 
of Charleston proved fleeting, the presence of SCLC in one of the South’s oldest and most 
segregated cities provided hope for Charleston’s black citizens to become politically active and 
engaged.  Young remembers the enthusiasm present throughout the campaign, “When I think of 
the Charleston strike today, I remember the ebullient spirit of the people, not the negotiating 
sessions or what we gained from the settlement.  Charleston was the singingest, preachingest, 
clappingest movement since our days in Albany and Selma.  In the mobilization of the 
community, there was a spirituality infused into the marches and the meetings that will always 
remain with me as an enduring memory.”154
      Like Young, Abernathy’s memories of Charleston seem limited to the immediate impact of 
the concessions won by SCLC and the striking workers. He contended that “In many ways the 
Charleston victory had been the most unambiguous we had achieved since Selma, though it by 
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no means had such far-reaching implications.”155
In addition, I had won a personal victory. The Poor People’s Campaign had been 
conceived and planned under Martin’s leadership, and whatever positive gains we 
made were attributed to him, while the failures were attributed to me.  But the 
Charleston campaign had been planned and executed under my leadership, and 
some of the remaining doubters had been silenced.  For the first time people were 
beginning to believe that the SCLC would have a life and a purpose beyond 
completing the projects already begun by Martin.
  In Abernathy’s view, the Charleston strike 
solidified his position as SCLC leader:  
156
 
 
The gradual decline of SCLC in the second half of 1969 and the early years of the 1970s, 
however, suggest that Charleston marked the conclusion of the organization’s standing as a 
powerful civil rights group capable of engaging in large direct-action campaigns.   Yet 
Abernathy remained committed to antipoverty campaigns for the remainder of his tenure as 
SCLC president and after he resigned from the organization in 1977.  As he explained, “It was 
for that segment of our population—the least fortunate of our brothers and sisters—that Martin 
gave his life and I worked during my tenure as SCLC president.”157
        A more glaring problem for Abernathy involved his decision to continue emulating King.  
While few people expected Abernathy to veer from King’s message and strategy during the Poor 
People’s Campaign due to the fact that King originally planned the encampment and 
Abernathy’s unfamiliarity in the position of SCLC’s president and public face, he missed an 
opportunity to establish his own identity as a leader.  By writing his own jailhouse letter during 
the strike, Abernathy attempted to persuade Charleston’s residents of the necessity for salary 
increases and collective bargaining for the city’s hospital workers.  Instead, the “Letter from 
Charleston County Jail” failed to resonate with the public.  Reflecting on the letter twenty years 
later, Abernathy conceded that, “I tried to imitate Martin and wrote a letter from a Charleston 
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jail, but no words of indignation came from the national newspapers, no marching crowds poured 
into Charleston.”158
      The Charleston strike represents an extension of the chronology of the SCLC’s direct-action 
campaigns of the civil rights era.  The organization’s nonviolent protests did not conclude with 
the triumphant tone of the 1965 Selma to Montgomery voting rights march or with the somber 
mood of the Memphis sanitation workers’ strike after King’s death.  Instead, this era ended with 
the 1969 Charleston strike, a campaign that resulted in tangible gains for Abernathy and the 
strike’s participants as well as unfulfilled goals in the years to come. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
‘WE HAVE NO SUPERSTARS AT THE MOMENT’ 
 
 
      On May 23, 1970, Ralph David Abernathy spoke in front of the last major rally of a direct-
action campaign during his tenure as SCLC president.  Speaking to a crowd estimated at “close 
to 10,000 persons,” Abernathy declared that, “over the last 15 years, there has grown to maturity 
a movement here in the South, with national and international support, that is determined to 
establish freedom and representative government and an end to the tyranny of racism and war, 
and we are determined to do it in this decade of the seventies.”  Abernathy delivered his remarks 
at a rally that served as the culmination of a “march against repression” that spanned five days 
and 110 miles from Perry, Georgia to Atlanta in the wake of multiple high-profile shootings by 
law enforcement officials in May 1970.159
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  Within a two-week period, four anti-war 
demonstrators died at the hands of the Ohio National Guard at Kent State University, police 
officers killed two black students at Jackson State College and six young African American 
protesters in Augusta, Georgia.  The Augusta shooting spurred Abernathy and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) into action.  At the funeral of Sammy McCullough, a 
nineteen-year-old victim of the Augusta shooting, Abernathy announced plans for the march.  
The SCLC president argued that America suffered from a “national climate of fear and 
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repression which has been created by a national Administration in pursuit of a racist political 
Southern strategy and a militaristic foreign policy.”160
      In addition to Abernathy, the rally featured speeches from Coretta Scott King and U.S. 
Senator George McGovern (D-SD).  McGovern blasted the Nixon Administration for its divisive 
rhetoric and a political strategy that enhanced tension and distrust between America’s white and 
black citizenry.  The senator declared, “The kind of Southern strategy that makes sense is the 
kind that we have here today.  We cannot afford to expend our energies hating each other.  We 
cannot afford to set worker against student, youth against age, white against black.  There will be 
no end to the violence against hunger and division in America until we end the violence that is 
devouring our blood and resources in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.”
 
161
      In her address to the crowd, King absolved African Americans of blame for the recent 
shootings, “America, we are not your enemy.  Your enemy are those forces of repression in the 
nation that will silence all dissent in this nation by any means possible.”
 
162  In addition to the 
presence of Abernathy and King, the march featured participation from members of Georgia’s 
NAACP chapters, which co-sponsored the demonstration.163
      At the conclusion of the rally in Atlanta, SCLC activists expressed a sense of optimism about 
the direction of the organization and the future of the black freedom struggle at the dawn of a 
  By the end of the 1960s, the 
NAACP and the SCLC represented America’s two most prominent civil rights organizations. 
Yet the two groups did not always cooperate in the planning and organizing of direct-action 
campaigns for civil rights advances.  For instance, two years before the Perry-to-Atlanta march, 
the NAACP did not participate in the Poor People’s Campaign. 
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new decade.  One SCLC staffer explained the significance of the march and rally to a reporter, 
“We needed this.  Doc [Mr. Abernathy] needed it, S.C.L.C. needed it, the black people needed it 
and so did the nation.”  Another SCLC worker characterized the enthusiasm and solidarity 
among the march’s participants as “just like Selma to Montgomery—like Birmingham and like 
the demonstrations in Montgomery.”  In addition to SCLC activists, the march’s white 
participants also described the camaraderie that existed among marchers of both races during the 
demonstration.  According to one white marcher, “This is the first time white people are not 
marching out of guilt.  This is the first time they are marching because they can see that they 
must act against repression that could crush us all.”164
      Although the march from Perry to Atlanta rekindled the spirit of some of SCLC’s greatest 
triumphs of the 1960s and the speeches delivered by Abernathy, King, and McGovern stirred 
passion among the thousands who attended the rally, the organization failed to build on the 
momentum established by the event.  Within three months of the rally, Abernathy identified the 
reasons for the economic inequality that plagued the nation.  In a commencement speech at 
Bethune-Cookman College, Abernathy proclaimed that the U.S. government’s commitment to 
the space program siphoned valuable funds from fighting poverty, which he viewed as the 
nation’s greatest problem.  According to Abernathy, collecting rock samples from the moon 
diverted attention from the uncomfortable reality of starving children in the rural South, “Vice 
President Spiro Agnew went around the world giving samples of those rocks to hads [sic] of 
state—when he ought to be traveling in Alabama and Mississippi passing out bread to starving 
children.”
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      Unable to mount a large-scale national direct-action campaign such as the Poor People’s 
Campaign or the 1965 Selma-to-Montgomery voting rights march, SCLC engaged in local 
protests during the early seventies.  For example, the organization launched a protest in Butler, 
Alabama during the fall of 1971.  On September 11, a white motorist struck and killed Margaret 
Ann Knott, a nineteen-year-old black woman as she participated in a sit-in demonstration on the 
streets of Butler, located in rural Choctaw County, a county with a near even split of African 
Americans and whites among its 17,000 residents.  Knott’s death heightened racial tension in a 
region where blacks began a boycott of white-owned businesses three and a half months earlier 
and roughly ninety percent of the black students at county schools sat out the first two weeks of 
the 1971-72 academic year.166
      Abernathy traveled to Butler to speak at Knott’s funeral on September 14.  Identifying Knott 
as “one more black martyr” in “the struggle for what is right,” Abernathy announced plans for a 
march in Butler the following day.  In his remarks to the crowd of 2,500 attendees, Abernathy 
declared, “We’re going to march tomorrow and the next day and the next and however long it 
takes to guarantee that people won’t have to die for their rights.”  Leon Clark, the local sheriff, 
told a visiting reporter that any march would violate a court order prohibiting public 
demonstrations and result in the arrest of the protesters, “If they march tomorrow, they’re going 
to be arrested.”
 
167
      Clark’s warning failed to deter Abernathy and Butler’s black residents. On September 15, 
Abernathy led a march of 154 protestors through the streets of Butler.  State troopers arrested all 
of the demonstrators and the apprehension of an additional 39 black youths for a variety of 
offenses ranging from disturbing the peace and destruction of public property to making a false 
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bomb threat resulted in a total of 193 arrests.  With Abernathy incarcerated at the Choctaw 
County jail, two other SCLC officials, board chairman Joseph Lowery and Bernard Lee, 
Abernathy’s executive assistant, traveled to Butler.  After they arrived in town, Lee proclaimed, 
“We have decided this is the place to stand our ground.”168
      Choctaw County’s black residents began their boycott to protest the previous spring’s firing 
of eight black schoolteachers and the lack of black officers on the city’s police force and deputies 
in the county sheriff’s department.
 
169
      The incarceration of Abernathy and the media coverage that accompanied it brought local 
leaders from the county’s white and black communities and SCLC officials to the negotiating 
table.  The two sides reached an agreement just before Abernathy posted bond and walked out of 
the Choctaw County jail, three days after his arrest. Terms of the agreement included a 
stipulation that called for the hiring of a black deputy by the county sheriff’s department and a 
black police officer by the city along with a promise to create an assistant school superintendent 
position for an African American pending the availability of federal funds.  In addition, the 
accord permitted black children to return to county schools “without reprisal,” left open the 
possibility that one of the fired teachers “would be given an opportunity for re-employment,” and 
  Following months of relatively uneventful peaceful 
protests, the death of Knott enticed Abernathy to speak at her funeral and remain in town to lead 
demonstrations.  Abernathy’s visit to Butler generated coverage of the previously unknown black 
freedom struggle in Choctaw County in The New York Times, which dispatched a reporter to the 
town to cover the funeral and subsequent protests.  In addition, newspapers such as the Chicago 
Tribune, the Washington Post, and the Atlanta Constitution published the Associated Press wire 
story of the arrest of Abernathy and the other marchers. 
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established a local biracial advisory board.  In return for these concessions, the county’s black 
leaders agreed to a 45-day moratorium on public protests. After his release from the county jail, 
Abernathy spoke of the agreement in grandiose terms in an address to the city’s jubilant black 
residents, “I hail this not only as a victory for black people but for all poor people in southwest 
Alabama.  I count this as the greatest victory SCLC has ever achieved since I have been 
president, and also the greatest victory by SCLC since its inception.”170
      Abernathy’s frequent use of bold rhetoric in his public remarks served as the most 
distinguishing characteristic between his stint as SCLC president and King’s tenure as the 
organization’s leader and public face.  In the week before the opening of Resurrection City, UPI 
reporter Louis Cassels noted that the language and tone of Abernathy’s public comments 
represented a sharp departure from the intellectual appeals made by King, whose speeches 
resonated with white liberals and the black middle class.  Cassels observed that, “Compared to 
King, Abernathy is less polished and articulate.  He lacks King’s cool poise and personal 
magnetism.  He is an angrier man.  He speaks more bluntly.  He says he intends to be more 
militant than King, and those who have seen him in action during the past six weeks are inclined 
to believe him.”
 
171
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   During an interview with the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in 1975, 
Abernathy viewed a series of internal memos from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Vice 
President Spiro Agnew in which the two men depicted Abernathy as a serious threat.  According 
to Abernathy, the two men concurred on the need to “silence” the SCLC president during the 
Poor People’s Campaign in 1968.  Abernathy boasted that Agnew wrote in a memo to Hoover, 
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“We’ve got to stop this Ralph David Abernathy because I have discovered that he is one of the 
most dangerous of all the black leaders.”172
      Given his penchant for blunt rhetoric, Abernathy’s comments on the resolution in Butler 
come across as an exaggerated assessment of the accord’s significance by an exuberant leader 
basking in the immediate aftermath of a clear victory.  Years later, in an autobiography that 
spanned 620 pages, Abernathy did not include a single word about the Butler demonstrations.  If 
Abernathy viewed Butler as “the greatest victory SCLC has ever achieved since I have been 
president and, also the greatest victory by SCLC since its inception,” it stands to reason that the 
event would occupy a significant space within his autobiography.  By contrast, he devoted an 
entire chapter to the 1969 Charleston hospital workers’ strike.  In his study on the SCLC, Adam 
Fairclough spends just two sentences on the Butler protests.  In the same chapter, Fairclough 
asserts that the Charleston strike represented “SCLC’s most important achievement” during 
Abernathy’s presidency.
 
173
      During the final years of King’s life, Jesse Jackson joined SCLC. Jackson participated in 
many of the organizations campaigns including the Selma-to-Montgomery voting rights march in 
1965 and the Memphis sanitation workers’ strike in 1968. Jackson energized the organization 
with his commitment to improving economic opportunities for African Americans and his 
formidable talents as a public speaker.  Abernathy noticed Jackson’s ability to inspire audiences 
during the Selma campaign: “Though not a preacher with a permanent pulpit, he could take the 
language of the sermon and translate it into the language of practical politics and that made him 
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an extraordinary leader of black people—something I recognized in him the first time I heard 
him speak at Selma.”174
      In addition to his leadership skills, Jackson possessed an entrepreneurial spirit and an 
attraction to the spotlight. These personality traits occasionally created internal conflict within 
SCLC during King’s presidency, but King possessed the gravitas to maintain a cohesive 
environment within the organization and senior staff members, including Jackson, put aside their 
personal ambitions for the benefit of the organization.  Jackson directed Operation Breadbasket, 
a Chicago-based SCLC program that through a variety of methods, including organized boycotts 
of individual companies, aimed to increase black employment at businesses and corporations that 
depended on black customers.  In a meeting that took place days before he returned to Memphis 
for the final time, King attempted to convince SCLC staff members on the necessity to return to 
Memphis after an ill-fated protest in late March.  According to Andrew Young, King told 
Jackson, James Bevel, and Hosea Williams why they needed to join him in Memphis instead of 
focusing on their individual pet projects.  Speaking directly to Jackson, King said, “Look, 
whenever you needed me or wanted me to come to Chicago, I’ve always been there supporting 
your efforts.  Now when we’re trying to get a national movement going, I don’t really have your 
support.”
 
175
      Jackson relented and joined King in Memphis.  After King died, Jackson lied to reporters 
with a false story that the SCLC president died in his arms. Despite this fabrication, Jackson 
served as city manager of Resurrection City until Abernathy and Young reassigned him and 
installed Williams into the position at the end of May 1968.  As Gerald McKnight notes, “Some 
of King’s lieutenants harbored deep resentment against Jackson for what they regarded as his 
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tasteless, self-serving behavior at the time of the civil rights leader’s assassination.  Jackson 
engrossed the media with his fake story of reaching the stricken leader first and cradling the 
dying King in his arms.”176 Abernathy contended that King grew frustrated with Jackson’s 
ceaseless pleas for permission to launch new initiatives that would result in tremendous gains in 
funds and publicity for the SCLC.  According to Abernathy, “After Martin was killed, I inherited 
the problem of Jesse’s entrepreneurial zeal along with the other assets and liabilities of the 
SCLC.  The difference between me and Martin, however, was that I was less inclined to say ‘no’ 
and more inclined to say ‘maybe’; and for Jesse ‘maybe’ invariably translated into ‘yes.’”177
      By December 1971, less than three months after the resolution of the Butler demonstrations, 
Jackson’s freewheeling actions forced the SCLC to intervene with the administration of 
Operation Breadbasket.  In 1969, Jackson organized Black Expo, a trade fair accompanied by 
performances and appearances by entertainers, in Chicago.  SCLC sponsored Black Expo, which 
brought in $66,000 in funds for the organization in 1969, according to Abernathy.
   
178
      With Jackson coordinating Black Expo, Abernathy and his staff focused on SCLC’s other 
projects as well as the day-to-day operations of the organization.  On September 29, 1970, 
Jackson formed Black Expo Foundation.  Both Illinois state regulations and federal law required 
foundations and charitable trusts to provide a financial report on an annual basis that included all 
of the organization’s revenues and expenditures. In addition, Illinois regulations stipulated that 
all new foundations and trusts needed to register with the offices of the state’s attorney general 
and secretary of state.  Nearly a year after the formation of the foundation, Jackson, who never 
  Jackson 
administered Black Expo with little oversight from SCLC’s national office in Atlanta.           
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completed the required registration for Black Expo Foundation, created a corporation, Black 
Expo, Inc., which qualified for tax exempt status from the IRS.  Moreover, Illinois did not 
require financial disclosures from corporations.  Jackson formed Black Expo Foundation, 
allowed the foundation to dissolve through a failure to register with the state, and created Black 
Expo, Inc., without the knowledge of Abernathy or any member of the SCLC’s board of 
directors.179 Abernathy first learned of Jackson’s activities with the foundation and the 
corporation when a reporter from the Chicago Tribune confronted him at Atlanta’s Hartsfield 
Airport as he returned from another trip. When the reporter presented Abernathy with documents 
which identified Black Expo, Inc. as a private corporation with its own board of directors rather 
than an affiliate of the SCLC, he realized that the organization needed to deal with a serious legal 
problem.  A contingent of SCLC officials that included Abernathy and the board of directors 
traveled to Chicago to examine the legal questions involving Black Expo, Inc. and conduct a 
meeting with Jackson.180
      At the conclusion of a day-long hearing with Jackson on Friday December 3, the SCLC 
levied a 60-day suspension with pay against the Operation Breadbasket director and the 
organization announced plans to conduct a comprehensive investigation into Black Expo, Inc. 
and Jackson’s actions.  Joseph Lowery, chairman of the SCLC’s board of directors, proclaimed, 
“This action is solely related to Rev. Jackson’s repeated violations of organizational policies as 
an employed member of the SCLC staff and there is no indication of any fiscal dishonesty.”
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Jackson attended Operation Breadbasket’s Saturday night meeting the day after the 
announcement of his suspension.  As a “guest speaker,” Jackson told a crowd of “more than 
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3,000 blacks” his relationship with Abernathy remained strong and the suspension did not signify 
a rift between the two men.  Instead, Jackson blamed Angela Parker, the Tribune reporter who 
broke the story of his covert financial activity with Black Expo, Inc., for the suspension he 
received.  As Jackson saw it, “The issue is that last Friday a black woman reporter left Chicago 
with her mission being to separate great black men.  She took a plane from the Tribune Tower to 
Atlanta.  Now you know who your enemy is.”182
      After attending the meeting and hearing Jackson’s accusation against her, Parker called 
Abernathy to get his reaction for the story.  The SCLC president absolved Parker of any 
culpability for Jackson’s suspension.  Abernathy explained: 
   
Miss Parker did not give me the impression that she is an enemy of the black man, 
nor that she was seeking to destroy our organization even tho [sic] Miss Parker 
may have been seeking to accomplish this goal.  She gave me the impression, 
however, that she had the welfare of black and poor people and the movement at 
heart and was seeking to bring to my attention some violations, which if not 
corrected, certainly might destroy the most live and vibrant human rights 
organization in our nation today.183
 
 
Toward the end of her story, Parker included reaction from Anna Langford, an alderman on 
Chicago’s city council and a spokeswoman for the board of directors of the local SCLC chapter, 
which illustrated the tremendous support for Jackson in the city.  When asked what she thought 
of the national board’s charges of Jackson’s “repeated violations of organizational policy,” 
Langford asserted that “if Jackson is guilty, the board, too, was guilty.”184
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the large crowd turnout and the vote of confidence in Jackson issued by Langford on behalf of 
the local SCLC chapter demonstrated that Jackson did not need Operation Breadbasket and the 
SCLC to maintain his influence as a leader of Chicago’s black citizens.   
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      Eight days after the announcement of his suspension, Jackson informed Abernathy of his 
decision to resign from the SCLC in a telegram.  Jackson explained that the length of his 
suspension left him with no alternative options because, “60 days is too long for Operation 
Breadbasket to go without leadership.”  In The New York Times, Seth S. King depicted the 
resignation as the culmination of a rift between Jackson and Abernathy that originated the 
previous spring when the SCLC president demanded the relocation of Operation Breadbasket 
from Chicago to Atlanta, an order which Jackson refused.185  King contended that Jackson’s 
resignation “also signaled a struggle for leadership of the national black community mobilized 
by the late Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.”186
      Jackson held a press conference at the Saturday meeting of Operation Breadbasket to inform 
his supporters of his resignation.  Free from the authority of SCLC, Jackson admitted that his 
philosophical differences with Abernathy resulted in a strained relationship between the two civil 
rights leaders, “When it becomes clear two people cannot work together, they should amicably 
divorce.”  Speaking about Abernathy, Jackson added, “I’m glad we have the same goals, but the 
problem is we are choosing different roads.  Progress is impaired when inner conflict diverts us 
from our course of action.  When education and welfare should have made headlines these last 
few weeks, bridges between myself and Dr. Abernathy have hidden the real problems and the 
papers have dealt with a personality called Jesse.”
   
187
      Although Jackson insisted that he would create a new organization without SCLC’s assets, 
one Jackson biographer noted that, “in fact, he transported with him into PUSH not only all of 
Breadbasket’s files and office equipment but most of its membership, including its entire staff of 
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twenty-five, and all but five of its thirty-five board members.”188  Within one day of Jackson’s 
resignation, a group of influential black businessmen and politicians met in New York’s 
Commodore Hotel, where they decided to support Jackson in the establishment of a new “black 
economic development organization.”  Carl Stokes, the former mayor of Cleveland, Richard 
Hatcher, the mayor of Gary, Indiana, and entertainer Ossie Davis attended the meeting along 
with singers Aretha Franklin and Roberta Flack.  Serving as the group’s spokesman, Stokes 
explained the reason for the hastily scheduled meeting, “Many of us felt we could not lose the 
leadership of this young man.”  Stokes attempted to absolve Abernathy of responsibility for the 
group’s decision to support Jackson by declaring, “This is in no way a reproach against S.C.L.C. 
and the Rev. Ralph David Abernathy.”  Yet he confirmed that the group agreed to offer 
“financial, physical, moral, and professional support” for “a new framework or vehicle” that 
would allow Jackson to “continue the new thrust in the area of economic development.”189
        With the SCLC’s Chicago chapter dormant in the wake of Jackson’s departure, questions 
about the organization’s future began to surface at the beginning of 1972.  As the fourth 
anniversary of King’s death approached, a reporter examined the state of the SCLC in a New 
York Times article.  One of the main reasons cited for SCLC’s struggle to maintain its position as 
an effective human rights organization capable of planning and leading large-scale nonviolent 
demonstrations involved a decline in both financial resources and manpower.  At the height of 
King’s presidency in the mid-sixties, SCLC operated with a staff of 150 along with an additional 
1,000 volunteers.  The organization’s operating budget during these years often surpassed $1 
million.  By the time Jackson resigned at the end of 1971, the SCLC’s full-time staff consisted of 
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61 employees and its operating budget fell to $917,000.190  Since most of SCLC’s successful 
campaigns after King’s death took place at the local level in the South, Roy Reed reported that 
some of the organization’s supporters thought Jackson’s departure “might prompt the conference 
to refocus its prime attention on the South.”  Reed noted, “A few of Dr. King’s advisers thought 
it was a mistake for him to take the organization into the North when he opened his Chicago 
campaign for economic equality in 1966.”191
      The article concluded with the remarks of two black men who followed King but did not 
work for SCLC and they contended that the organization along with other civil rights groups 
lacked the ability to enact meaningful change in the 1970s. Dr. Vincent Harding, director of the 
Institute for the Black World in Atlanta, an organization previously affiliated with the Martin 
Luther King Jr. Memorial Center, asserted that, “When one speaks of the Urban League, of 
S.N.C.C., of CORE, of S.C.L.C., of the N.A.A.C.P., it is almost as though he is speaking of 
ghosts because the era of civil rights is over.  Yet our movement, on the whole, has not moved 
forward with the times.  We still rely too strongly on the strategies of the past, strategies no 
longer adequate to the present and future needs of black America.”  Ivanhoe Donaldson, an 
African American working as a Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, offered a 
blunt assessment of the state of the civil and human rights movements, “We have no superstars at 
the moment in terms of the civil rights and peace movements.  And maybe there’s no need for 
one.”
  
192
      Three weeks after the publication of the Times article, Abernathy returned to Chicago.  
Speaking at the inaugural “Recall to Commitment Rally” at Mt. Pisgah Baptist Church, 
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Abernathy told a crowd of nearly 800 people that the SCLC remained committed to Chicago, 
“I’ve come to reiterate the fact that SCLC is still burning in Chicago and will be here as long as 
justice reigns.”  In a clear reference to Jackson’s comments at the press conference where he 
announced his resignation nearly six weeks earlier, Abernathy defended the SCLC’s methods of 
pursuing economic opportunities and social change, “There are those who say that the tools we 
use to gain our freedom are outdated, but we’re in Chicago on a mission…and, if we perish, we 
perish.”  Abernathy announced Operation Breadbasket’s new leadership team of C.T. Vivian, 
executive director of SCLC’s Chicago chapter, and Noah Robinson, Jackson’s half-brother, as 
Breadbasket’s new director.193
      Even with a new leadership team and renewed commitment from SCLC’s national office, the 
organization’s Chicago affiliate struggled to raise money and remain relevant after Jackson’s 
departure.  By mid-January 1972, Jackson launched Operation PUSH (People United to Save 
Humanity) and his new organization continued to raise funds from Chicago’s black community.  
In March, Vivian accused Jackson’s staff at Operation PUSH of “weakening SCLC’s ability to 
operate in the black community.”  According to Vivian, “Operation PUSH’s refusal to give us an 
accounting of Black Expo funds and to return all our files and furniture has made it difficult for 
us to operate in the way we should.”
 
194
      In addition to competing for funds against Operation PUSH, SCLC’s Chicago chapter 
suffered from internal problems.  At the 1972 SCLC annual convention in Dallas, held just seven 
months after the organization announced its new leadership team in Chicago, Abernathy and the 
board of directors conducted a five-hour staff meeting to resolve a power struggle between 
Vivian and John L. Thurston, president of the Chicago chapter.  Vivian resigned from his 
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position days before the meeting took place on August 17.  Similar to the rift between Operation 
Breadbasket and SCLC’s national office that resulted in Jackson’s resignation the previous year, 
the feud between Vivian and Thurston stemmed from a dispute over the finances of the 
organization’s Chicago affiliate.  Members of the Chicago chapter’s board of directors accused 
Vivian of “excessive spending and excessive salaries” for staff members that he hired without 
the approval of the local board.  According to Thurston, who presented his complaints about 
Vivian’s actions to Abernathy and the organization’s national board, “Dr. Abernathy listened to 
the whole discussion, and he said that whatever was decided about the Chicago chapter would be 
up to the board and me as president.”195
      Financial woes continued to present a formidable challenge for Abernathy and SCLC in 
1973.  In order to stay alive, the organization reduced its staff to just 17 full-time employees by 
the end of 1972.  The organization’s annual operating budget, which peaked at $4 million in 
1968 when donors filled SCLC’s coffers in the wake of King’s assassination, topped out at 
$500,000 in 1972.  By April, Abernathy remained unsure if the 1973 budget would match the 
previous year’s total.
 
196  Abernathy explored all options to increase the organization’s funds and 
manpower, including meeting with Jackson in early March to discuss a potential merger with 
Operation PUSH.  The common challenge of raising money and building an organized 
opposition to Richard Nixon’s domestic policies brought the two men together to discuss 
collaboration opportunities for the two organizations.197
      Within two weeks of their initial meeting, Abernathy and Jackson announced plans to lead a 
series of marches and demonstrations to protest Nixon’s economic policies.  At a news 
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conference at PUSH’s Chicago headquarters, where leaders from SCLC, the National Welfare 
Rights Organization, and PUSH conducted a two-day strategy session, Abernathy declared 
Nixon’s policies prompted the collaboration of the organizations in spite of any previous 
disagreements. “But Richard M. Nixon is going to bring us closer together.” He continued, 
“Whatever differences we had were all in the family.”  Despite the united front displayed by 
Abernathy and Jackson at the press conference, the PUSH leader refuted reports of a potential 
merger with SCLC.198
      Three weeks later, on the fifth anniversary of King’s assassination, Abernathy and Jackson 
led a group of 500 demonstrators on a march through downtown Atlanta.  Beginning at King’s 
former church, Ebenezer Baptist, Abernathy and Jackson led marchers to the Georgia Capitol 
building and Atlanta’s City Hall before reaching Herndon Stadium on the campus of Morris 
Brown College, where they addressed the crowd of fellow demonstrators.  At City Hall, 
Abernathy read a list of demands for Atlanta mayor Sam Massell and left a copy of the list with a 
secretary.  When Abernathy called for the dismissal of John Inman, the city’s police chief, a 
chant of “Fire Inman” broke out among the marchers.  Other demands included the establishment 
of a citizens review board to examine the distribution of revenue sharing funds and a call for the 
reduction of sales taxes.  Upon reaching the stadium, demonstrators heard speeches from 
Abernathy, Jackson, and several other speakers.  Abernathy and Jackson directed their ire at the 
Nixon Administration.  Jackson spoke of the need for “civil disobedience in the governors’ 
offices.  Let it be known we’d rather eat in jail than starve in the streets.” Abernathy warned the 
crowd of Nixon’s ability to cut anti-poverty programs that America’s impoverished citizens 
depended on, “We have a dangerous man on our hands, by the name of King Richard the First.  
We’ve got to say to Pharaoh Nixon that black people, poor people, are not going to sit idly by 
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while he cuts out all the programs.  We’re not going to let Mr. Nixon rebuild Hanoi and rebuild 
North Vietnam when, hell, he had no business tearing it up in the first place.”199
      The SCLC failed to build on the energy generated by Abernathy and Jackson at the outset of 
the “spring offensive” on Nixon’s economic policies.  The Atlanta march and rally on the 
anniversary of King’s death followed the same paradigm as many of Abernathy’s public 
addresses at demonstrations after the split with Jackson at the end of 1971.  As a reporter noted 
in a Washington Post article on the decline of the SCLC, Abernathy’s speaking engagements 
involved traveling to a city to “deliver a few speeches, maybe hold a rally, perhaps participate in 
a march, then go somewhere else to repeat that performance.  In his speeches, attacks on national 
policy toward the poor get an emphasis equal to—or greater than—the local issue that brought 
him in.”
 
200
      While other members of King’s inner circle at SCLC turned their attention to different 
methods in their quest to lift blacks from poverty into the middle class, Abernathy and SCLC 
utilized many of the tactics that King employed a decade earlier, such as marches and fiery 
rhetoric.  For example, Andrew Young, executive director of SCLC under both King and 
Abernathy, left the organization in 1970 to pursue a political career. By the spring of 1973, 
Young worked toward enacting social change as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
serving Georgia’s fifth district.  Although he no longer worked alongside Abernathy with the 
SCLC, Young contended that he remained committed to the organization’s goals. “I’ve 
obviously staked my life with politics,” Young told the Washington Post. “I hope I’m in the 
movement in a new form.  My commitment to the things we were struggling for in SCLC hasn’t 
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swerved a bit.”201 One month before Operation PUSH held its second annual convention in July, 
Jackson explained the difference between PUSH and other civil rights organizations, such as the 
SCLC, “PUSH is on the offensive.  The movement has changed from traditional civil rights to 
social justice.  Civil rights asked the questions where shall men eat, where shall men live?  Social 
justice raises the questions whether men shall eat, whether men shall live.”202
      Frustrated by SCLC’s dire financial position and the organization’s struggle to raise funds 
amid a crowded landscape of organizations dedicated to the advancement of civil and human 
rights, Abernathy announced his resignation on July 9.  In a press conference at the 
organization’s headquarters, Abernathy cited SCLC’s lack of adequate finances as the reason for 
his decision to step down from the organization he co-founded with King and other black 
preachers in 1957, “I am resigning because of a lack of financial support which is so desperately 
needed at this time to institute and carry out creative and dynamic programs in a nation in crisis.”  
Abernathy blamed SCLC’s financial troubles on Coretta Scott King’s efforts to raise money for 
the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Social Change, which he believed siphoned funds away 
from the SCLC since King reached out to many of the same donors that SCLC targeted.  The 
SCLC president declared that King’s widow, “still receives 100 percent of my backing in her 
work,” but Abernathy contended that the SCLC deserved a share of the funds raised by King and 
the center’s staff.  Abernathy informed reporters that the SCLC had a debt of $50,000 and 
possessed $30,000 in assets, stocks, and bonds.
  
203
      In addition to King’s widow, Abernathy also criticized affluent black citizens for their lack of 
support.  Abernathy argued that middle class black Americans earned their social status through 
the organization’s “struggles and the struggles of other poor people but will not support SCLC 
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financially and make it possible for this organization to meet its obligations and commitments.”  
He added that, “If poor people are unable to finance the movement but can and will supply the 
troops, then certainly the middle class black people who have ‘arrived’ and now receive fairly 
decent salaries should supply the finances.”  Abernathy told reporters that his resignation would 
take effect on August 16 at the SCLC’s annual convention and he planned on devoting more time 
to his position as pastor of Atlanta’s West Hunter Street Baptist Church.204
      Abernathy’s decision to resign elicited a wide variety of reactions from activists that worked 
with him as well as members of the news media.  Jesse Jackson told a reporter that he attempted 
to reach Abernathy by phone “four or five times” after the press conference, but he failed to 
connect with his former colleague.  Jackson described his relationship with Abernathy as 
“sound” and he added, “I have great personal concern for him.  I hope that the organization will 
survive his resignation.  I’ll do anything I can to help.”  Ben Branch, another Chicago-based 
SCLC veteran, learned of Abernathy’s resignation from a reporter.  Branch expressed regret after 
receiving the news, “I’m sorry to hear about that.  I don’t know of a person more dedicated to the 
welfare of the people than Ralph Abernathy.”  According to Branch, some SCLC officials never 
embraced Abernathy’s leadership style, “They were looking for Ralph to be a Martin Luther 
King, and he (Abernathy) kept telling them there was no way he could do that.”
   
205
      In their assessment of Abernathy’s years of service to the SCLC and his tenure as the 
organization’s president, several newspaper columnists asserted that he performed well under 
very difficult circumstances.  Frank L. Stanley, a Chicago Defender columnist, acknowledged 
that Abernathy “had a nearly impossible task from the very outset, not only to follow MLK Jr. as 
SCLC’s leader, but to hold the organization together.” Stanley agreed with Abernathy’s 
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argument that middle class blacks crippled the SCLC by failing to provide financial support in 
the years since King’s death.  According to Stanley, “We have yet to learn that our most 
successful blacks actually stand no taller than our lowliest poverty-stricken brothers and sisters 
in the worst hell holes of America.”  Stanley concluded with an argument that black Americans 
still needed the SCLC, “We still need a well-financed, active, crusading Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference even more effective than in Dr. King’s hey day.  Obviously it has and 
can continue to perform a service not duplicated by any other of our black-oriented civil rights 
organizations.” 206
      Vernon Jarrett, a black columnist for the Chicago Tribune, argued that Abernathy suffered 
from the inevitable comparisons to King by the news media and black citizens.  Jarrett contended 
that reporters and SCLC supporters viewed King as a savior.  As a result, King’s death “was 
more a crucifixion than an assassination” and that the general public preferred civil rights leaders 
like King, who “had become a celebrity capable of attracting other celebrities, who, in turn could 
appeal to the hero-hungry black masses.”  According to Jarrett, the role of “messiah” never 
suited Abernathy, “I often had the feeling that he hungered for the old days, the old movement 
that started in Montgomery in December, 1955, when a group of unknown, unsung, nobodies 
won a monumental victory and set off the Black Revolt of the 1950s.”  Jarrett expressed concern 
over the effectiveness of the civil rights movement, especially if black Americans needed a 
celebrity to inspire them to participate in the quest for economic opportunities and social justice. 
“It is very easy to criticize the personalities of Dr. Abernathy, the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins, and 
other noncharismatic [sic] leaders,” he noted.  “But if the black civil rights movement must rely 
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on messiahs rather than planned, consistent, grass-roots programs then civil rights activity will 
become nothing more than a series of publicity stunts.”207
      Although Jarrett and Stanley argued that Abernathy fared well as SCLC president given the 
tremendous challenge that came with replacing the movement’s most iconic figure, Carl Rowan 
offered a dissenting opinion.  In his syndicated column, Rowan contended that Abernathy lacked 
the leadership skills to succeed King, “I don’t know five black people of real perception who 
truly believe Abernathy should have succeeded the assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.  
Abernathy lacked the articulation, the emotional balance, the sense of timing, the forcefulness of 
personality required to maintain SCLC as a vibrant force.”  Rowan asserted that, “Everyone 
around knew that Andrew Young, now a congressman from Atlanta, would have made a better 
successor.”  In addition, Rowan believed, “Abernathy’s less-than-brilliant, not-so-inspiring 
leadership is what led to the demise of SCLC.”  To support this claim, Rowan cited the Poor 
People’s Campaign, which he labeled “a disaster because no one could figure out what game 
Abernathy was playing.  The poor folks were miserable in the rain and mud while Abernathy 
often was comfortable in a motel.”  Rowan noted that other civil rights organizations also 
struggled to remain relevant during the early 1970s. According to Rowan, SNCC and CORE “are 
almost unheard of these days” while the NAACP and the National Urban League “are not giving 
the same kind of leadership they once did.”  He cited Abernathy’s estimation that the SCLC 
would likely raise $500,000 in 1973 as evidence of the organization’s inability to generate a 
mass following.  Rowan declared that, “The truth is that most of the current civil rights groups 
have no mass following.  None of the groups is motivating and directing the mass of blacks to 
take bold, meaningful steps in the interest of their own freedom.”
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      While Rowan blamed Abernathy for SCLC’s descent into a financial crisis and cultural 
irrelevancy, the organization’s staff and board of directors engaged in a frantic fundraising drive 
in an attempt to persuade Abernathy to reconsider. On July 23, two weeks after Abernathy 
announced his resignation, Bernard Lee arrived in Chicago to raise money for the organization.  
Stressing the need to earn contributions from white donors, the SCLC’s executive assistant told 
reporters that, “We are refusing Dr. Abernathy’s resignation.  Our strategy is to strengthen our 
national structure, not look for a new charismatic leader to head the organization.”209  Lee listed 
$25,000 as the amount he hoped to raise in the Chicago stop on a nationwide fundraising tour.  
He also hinted at a possible reconciliation between Abernathy and Coretta Scott King.  Lee 
characterized the differences between King’s successor and his widow as “minimal” and he 
added that, “If Nixon and Brezhnew can get together and if Kennedy and Wallace can get 
together, I think Dr. King’s widow and his best friend will be able to iron out their problems.”210
       At the time of Lee’s fundraising trip, Abernathy clarified his criticism of Mrs. King in 
remarks to a reporter.  He reiterated his support for Coretta King and the work she intended to 
spearhead as the King Center’s leader.  Abernathy explained that his primary concern involved 
the fundraising process, in which some donors might not understand the difference between the 
SCLC and the King Center.  Abernathy proclaimed that, “It has always been my position that 
Mrs. King has every right in the world to the Martin Luther King Center for Social Change.  It is 
unfortunate that the public has not known there is a great deal of difference between that 
organization and SCLC.  It is my belief that when they give to the center they think they’re 
giving to SCLC.”  In addition, Abernathy expressed his belief that SCLC should handle the role 
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of expanding on the work of King, “I was one of those who felt that Dr. King should be 
memorialized, but I did not feel there was a need for another organization.”211
      In an interview with the same reporter, Coretta Scott King expressed her belief that, “people 
who give to both organizations know the difference.”  She also explained her goals for the 
center, which extended beyond a memorial to her late husband, “The center has grown slowly 
because we did not want to push it too quickly.  We want a dynamic memorial, not a brick-and-
wall structure.  We want something that is lasting, in the spirit of the man, in the magnitude of 
the man.”  When asked about the possibility that SCLC might ask Abernathy to rescind his 
resignation and continue to serve as the organization’s president, King told the reporter that the 
organization should accept the resignation, “Rev. Abernathy has made his resignation and I feel 
it should be respected.  I’m sure he has given it a lot of thought.”
 
212
      Despite King’s belief that SCLC should accept Abernathy’s resignation and select a new 
leader, officials within the organization remained persistent in their attempts to persuade him to 
continue as president. Speaking alongside Abernathy at the annual conference of the 
International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies on July 19, Hosea Williams 
offered a grim prediction for the organization without Abernathy.  After serving in the 
organization’s national office with both King and Abernathy, Williams left to launch SCLC’s 
Atlanta chapter.  He told the crowd, “I don’t see anybody who can replace Ralph.  I can’t take 
the gamble on not having a brother at the national level.  I know what would happen to me 
without Ralph—they’d put me in jail and throw away the key.”  Williams believed Abernathy 
 
                                                          
211 Joel Dreyfuss, “Crisis at SCLC: Which Way for the Blacks’ Leadership?”Washington Post, July 24, 1973, A9. 
212 Ibid. 
 93 
 
would stay on if ordinary black citizens chose to participate in SCLC activities, “It depends on 
organizing the people.  Ralph will listen to the poor people.”213
       When Abernathy placed some of the blame for SCLC’s financial troubles on the black 
middle class at the press conference in which he announced his resignation, he alienated 
individuals within that sect of America’s black community.  Three weeks before SCLC held its 
16th annual convention, a group of civil rights activists and black businessmen in Chicago 
expressed their frustrations with Abernathy’s tenure at the helm of SCLC.  Edwin C. Berry, a 
former executive director with the Chicago Urban League and fundraiser for SCLC during 
King’s presidency, criticized Abernathy for a failure to reach out to potential fundraising 
contacts.  According to Berry, “Folks won’t give you money without being asked.  They won’t 
even pay a gas bill unless you send them one.  And to suggest there is no one in the country to 
replace him is just silly.  Anyone who followed Martin [Luther King Jr.] in that job was going to 
have a rough time.”  Berry added that SCLC officials never asked him to raise money for the 
organization despite his five-year stint as a Chicago-based fundraiser when King served as 
president, “But since then I have not been asked to do one thing even tho [sic] Ralph knew the 
role I had played.  If he missed me in Chicago, he must have missed a lot of others.”
 
214
      Earl B. Dickerson, one of Chicago’s prominent black businessmen, echoed Berry’s 
sentiments.  Dickerson cited a meeting of the city’s black businessmen, in which each individual 
pledged to donate “$50 to $100 a month” to provide a financial baseline for King to come to 
Chicago in 1966, as one example of support for SCLC by members of the black middle class.  
He also predicted larger contributions to civil rights organizations as blacks continued to ascend 
into America’s middle class, “However, I will grant that many blacks have not been responsive, 
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mainly because they are catching up with the fruits of our capitalistic society.  But as blacks 
become experienced as middle class citizens, they give more freely.”215
      Despite skepticism of Abernathy’s claims from middle class blacks such as Berry and 
Dickerson, SCLC officials believed that King’s designated successor remained the best option to 
lead the organization.  In addition to the public pleas for Abernathy to rescind his resignation 
made by staff members such as Bernard Lee and Hosea Williams, the organization’s leaders 
delayed forming a search committee for the position until one week before the convention 
opened in Indianapolis.
 
216  Outside of Coretta Scott King and Jesse Jackson, few other 
candidates received any mention as possible successors to Abernathy from the news media.  
Neither King nor Jackson displayed any interest in the position.  Two days before his resignation 
took effect, Abernathy reiterated his claim that he knew of “no candidate on the horizon whom I 
could suggest to take over the office.”217
      On August 15, following a contentious all-night meeting of SCLC’s board of directors, 
chairman Joseph Lowery announced that the board rejected Abernathy’s resignation. Abernathy 
subsequently agreed to continue serving as the organization’s president.  Lowery announced that, 
“We have prayerfully weighed all options in this crisis and have firmly concluded that at this 
moment in history, Ralph David Abernathy is the man for the presidency.”  In remarks to a 
reporter, an unidentified SCLC official characterized the lengthy board meeting as “very 
traumatic, with screaming matches and strong accusations.”  One of the main points of 
contention addressed in the meeting involved the makeup of SCLC’s national staff.  In the weeks 
between the announcement of his resignation and the convention, Abernathy suggested that part 
of SCLC’s struggles resulted from the organization’s national staff, which Abernathy inherited 
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from King.  On the convention floor, Hosea Williams proposed a resolution that sought the 
resignation of SCLC’s national staff so Abernathy could pick his own staff.  The proposal never 
received a vote and Abernathy pledged that he “will not ask the staff of SCLC to resign.”218
      In his address to the crowd, a rejuvenated Abernathy reaffirmed his commitment to lead 
SCLC through the uncertainty that accompanied a new era of the black freedom struggle.  
Abernathy proclaimed that, “I feel now that I have not only a mandate from Martin, a mandate 
from God, but a mandate from Black America.  Let me assure that I accept this challenge and 
this responsibility.”
 
219
      Within three years of his triumphant address in Indianapolis, Abernathy’s “mandate” 
dissolved when Chauncey Eskridge, SCLC’s top fundraiser, asked Abernathy to resign at a 
private dinner with several other board members. In the wake of that uncomfortable meeting, 
Abernathy opted to follow Young’s example and pursue a career in politics, the new arena of 
civil rights.
   
220
       Three months before Abernathy announced his resignation in July 1973, Maynard Jackson 
described the evolution of the civil rights movement to a student group at Morris Brown College. 
Seeking to become Atlanta’s first black mayor, Jackson outlined his vision for the next chapter 
of civil rights participation, “I think that politics is the civil rights movement of the 1970s.  I 
believe that it is the last nonviolent hurrah for those of us who believe we can make significant 
changes within the system.”  In his address, Jackson acknowledged the gains that resulted from 
marches and demonstrations in the sixties.  Yet he noted that the civil rights battlefield must 
move from the streets into capitol buildings in order to advance the movement.  According to 
 
                                                          
218 Joel Dreyfuss, “Dissent-Torn SCLC To Try To Regroup Behind Abernathy,” Washington Post, August 16, 1973, A7. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Abernathy, 580-584. 
 96 
 
Jackson, “We have seen a modulation now in the form of our protest…It is in politics now.  It 
says if you have enough votes, you can change how we live.”221
      Christopher P. Lehman argues that Jackson’s victory in the 1973 Atlanta mayoral election 
represents the moment when the civil rights leaders of the 1960s turned away from protests and 
demonstrations and embraced the potential to enact social change through politics.  Jackson’s 
win came on the heels of Andrew Young’s election to the U.S. House of Representatives, and 
Lehman asserts that it “gave weary civil rights leaders an excuse to announce that they would 
stop marching and withdraw into boardrooms and think tanks.”
   
222  Young believed that pursuing 
a political career “seemed like a natural culmination of so much we had worked for in the sixties.  
No objective of our Southern campaigns was more well focused than our voter registration 
drives, which we knew would affect politics in the South forever.”223  Yet while public office 
appealed to civil rights leaders, one historian notes that in Atlanta, white businessmen wielded 
enough power that both Jackson and Young realized that they needed support from this group in 
order to advance policy agendas during their respective mayoral terms.224
      After Young won a third term as the representative for Georgia’s Fifth District in the fall of 
1976, Jimmy Carter, fresh off his victory over Gerald Ford in the presidential election, tapped 
Young to serve as America’s ambassador to the United Nations.  As a result, a field of twelve 
candidates entered a special election to fill Young’s congressional seat in the winter of 1977.  
Abernathy announced his candidacy at a press conference on January 5.  In his address to 
reporters, Abernathy criticized John Lewis, executive director of the Voter Education Project, 
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former SNCC chairman, a participant in the 1965 Voting Rights March, and the favorite among 
the eight black candidates in the field.  Abernathy contended that, “I had the privilege of bringing 
John into the movement.  I worked and fought in order that John Lewis and everyone would have 
the right to get in the race.”  In addition, Abernathy portrayed Lewis as a candidate who lacked 
identifiable positions on any issues: “I really don’t know what John Lewis’s views are…His 
views have been to keep a very clean office, and to see that the papers and everything else are in 
place.”  Abernathy also predicted that Young, his former top aide at SCLC, would endorse him 
in the race.225
      In order to focus on the race, Abernathy resigned from SCLC, months after several members 
of the organization’s board of directors asked him to step down in a private meeting.  Years later, 
Abernathy explained that his tenuous status at SCLC did not serve as the primary reason for his 
decision to enter the congressional race, “Don’t misunderstand my motives in running for 
Congress.  I did not simply use the race as a way of bowing out, with never a thought of winning.  
I wanted to win.  I wanted to go to Congress—not only because it would have partially 
vindicated me in my own eyes, but also because it was an opportunity to render greater service to 
our people.”  Yet Young’s promotion to a key position in the Carter Administration allowed 
Abernathy to resign from SCLC without any public speculation regarding his departure from the 
organization.
 
226
      Abernathy’s goal throughout his tenure as SCLC president, eliminating poverty, served as the 
anchor for his congressional platform.  In his first press conference, Abernathy proclaimed that, 
as a congressman, “I will foster a program that will eliminate ill housing; while at the same time 
putting America back to work by offering tens of thousands of jobs to America’s unemployed in 
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building new homes for the poor and thereby reducing crime substantially.”  The other issues 
Abernathy championed included providing jobs with a livable wage to “every able-bodied 
American man and woman,” enhancing quality of life for senior citizens, and ensuring the 
preservation of the Chattahoochee River.  In addition, Abernathy listed promoting Atlanta as the 
“WORLD’S NEXT GREATEST INTERNATIONAL CITY” among his goals as a congressman.  
Abernathy argued that if he won the election, “This will enhance and point the way for American 
[sic] and the world that Atlanta’s multi-racial society is not only a reality, but a stable 
success.”227
      Abernathy’s campaign literature featured images of the multi-racial society that he advocated 
in his initial press conference. Brochures that described Abernathy as “A Proven Man For All 
Seasons,” contained photos of Abernathy with various dignitaries and groups. Words of praise 
from Benjamin L. Hooks, Tennessee’s first black criminal judge and the incoming executive 
director of the NAACP, sat just below a photograph of Abernathy addressing a table full of well-
dressed white citizens.  A message of support from Jimmy Carter, Georgia’s biggest civic 
booster outside of former Atlanta mayor William Hartsfield, occupied the space above the photo.  
In addition, multiple photos of Young appeared in the brochure, including one in which the two 
former SCLC staff members sat together wearing the denim outfits worn by demonstrators as 
protest apparel during the sixties.  The phrase, “In strategy conference with closest confidante,” 
served as the photo’s caption. Another photo showed Young in a playful embrace with 
Abernathy’s son Kwame, the youngest of his four children.
 
228
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endorsed Abernathy for the open seat.  The photos and messages came from Abernathy’s 
previous personal correspondence with the men. 
      In 1977, the electorate of the Fifth District consisted of an approximately 60-40 split with 
whites representing the majority.  Yet Young won three consecutive congressional elections 
from 1972-76 and Jackson carried the district in the 1973 mayoral election.  Out of a field of 12 
candidates, many observers listed two white men, Democrat Wyche Fowler, president of 
Atlanta’s city council, and Republican Paul Coverdell, a state senator, and two black men, 
Abernathy and Lewis, as the top contenders to advance to a runoff.  David Nordan, political 
editor of the Atlanta Journal, noted that both Fowler and Lewis, the two frontrunners, extolled 
the virtues of a diverse district where a candidate needed a biracial coalition of voters to get 
elected.  According to Nordan, “the real significance of the upcoming race is that in a city in a 
Deep South state where racial demagoguery and politics have been interchangeable words, every 
candidate who wants to be taken seriously is walking a tightrope not to offend anyone of a 
different color.”  Nordan contended that the significance of appealing to a biracial coalition of 
voters represented a sign of progress for the city, “This says simply that Atlantans are coming 
around to the realization that their problems have no color, that they likely are more interested in 
getting them solved than worrying about the race of the fellow who sits in the chair.”229
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  As 
historian Kevin M. Kruse demonstrated, Nordan’s depiction of Atlanta as a progressive city 
where race no longer mattered in local elections does not hold up.  As African Americans moved 
into the city during the postwar decades, white residents fled to Atlanta’s growing suburbs.  
According to Kruse, the city’s black residents accounted for just over a third of Atlanta’s total 
population in 1960.  By 1980, African Americans represented “a full two-thirds” of the city’s 
population.  Moreover, the white residents that remained inside Atlanta possessed an outsized 
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influence on local politics since the city’s most powerful business leaders remained 
overwhelmingly white.230
      From the outset of the race, Abernathy faced an uphill battle against Fowler and Lewis.  As 
president of Atlanta’s city council, Fowler developed a favorable reputation among the district’s 
electorate and understood the dynamics of local elections. Reflecting on the race in his 
autobiography, Abernathy admitted that he lacked the political skills to run an effective 
campaign against Fowler, “In the first place, I had spent most of my time out on the road, 
stamping out brush fires in the region, neglecting to build up a strong network of political allies 
in Atlanta.  I was well known, but only at a distance, whereas Wyche Fowler and the other 
candidates had been shaking hands and meeting voters for years.”
 
231
      While Fowler benefited from an intricate network of political contacts within the district, 
Lewis emerged as the strongest black candidate in a race that featured eight African American 
entrants.  In addition to receiving endorsements from prominent members of Atlanta’s black 
community, such as Maynard Jackson and Martin Luther King Sr., Lewis scored a major coup 
when he earned an endorsement from Young three weeks before the March 15 election.  Young’s 
decision to support Lewis stunned Abernathy, who believed his former SCLC colleague would 
either endorse him or remain neutral until a potential runoff occurred.  A frustrated Abernathy 
publicly ripped Young for what he viewed as a betrayal, “I didn’t think that he had the capacity 
to stoop to this level.  I was surprised and let down, because I have known him as a Christian and 
sincere individual.”  Abernathy added that he supported Young in prior campaigns and that 
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Young “wouldn’t have gotten elected to Congress in the first place without me and the help from 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.”232
      On March 15, 1977, the election unfolded just as political reporters such as Nordan 
anticipated. Fowler led all candidates with nearly 40 percent of the vote while Lewis took second 
at about 29 percent and Coverdell settled for third with 21 percent.  Abernathy finished a distant 
fourth with just over four percent of the vote.
 
233  Two weeks after his defeat, Abernathy endorsed 
Lewis in the runoff against Fowler.  Although he claimed that race did not factor into his 
decision to back Lewis, Abernathy conceded that Lewis’s civil rights activism, in which he 
served “as an apostle of nonviolence” appealed to him more than Fowler’s political 
experience.234
    
  Abernathy never again sought public office following the 1977 Fifth District race. 
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CONCLUSION 
      Ralph David Abernathy experienced the evolution of the civil rights movement over the 
course of the 1970s.  At the outset of the decade, he led brief revivals of the nonviolent protests 
that worked so well for SCLC in the sixties with the “March Against Repression” and the Butler 
protests.  The former event boosted morale among veteran SCLC activists and an interracial mix 
of young demonstrators while the latter brought new jobs and expanded the influence of black 
citizens in local governance in a rural corner of Alabama.  Abernathy encountered the 
frustrations of maintaining the fragile coalition of SCLC activists following the death of the 
organization’s iconic leader and the shifting attitude toward the movement from white liberals 
and middle class blacks.  In the decade’s later years, Abernathy followed the lead of Andrew 
Young, Maynard Jackson, and numerous other blacks who pursued their dreams of enacting 
social change through public office.  Over the course of seven years, Abernathy’s participation in 
the civil rights struggle shifted from leading direct-action demonstrations to campaigning for the 
opportunity to fight for the creation of new economic opportunities for blacks and impoverished 
Americans as a public servant. 
      King’s death caught America off-guard, including SCLC’s staff and the organization’s loyal 
supporters.  Although King insisted on designating a successor three years before he died, the 
organization’s staff did not prepare Abernathy for the tremendous responsibilities that came with 
SCLC’s presidency.  As a result, when Abernathy became the public face of SCLC, he 
encountered the external pressure of executing the Poor People’s Campaign and inspiring the 
American public to support a new phase of the civil rights movement centered on ambitious 
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economic objectives.  In addition, Abernathy inherited a staff mired in dysfunction and he 
struggled to unite a group of men with strong personalities and large egos, such as Jesse Jackson.  
Although SCLC’s senior staff members agreed with Abernathy’s embrace of King’s economic 
goals, his attempt to adopt King’s persona failed to resonate with the group: “Martin’s shoes 
were hard to fill,” noted Andy Young. “Ralph had been handed the position of Martin’s 
successor because of his genuine loyalty to Martin.  I tried to support Ralph, to shore up his 
weaknesses, but he was frustrated by his inability to be Martin Luther King.”  Young explained 
that, “No matter how I urged him to be Ralph Abernathy, the powerful preacher and committed 
activist, he kept trying to imitate Martin rather than developing his own style of leading 
SCLC.”235
      Furthermore, at the time of Abernathy’s ascension to SCLC president Lyndon Johnson 
lacked the political capital and the desire to push Congress for legislation to meet the wholesale 
economic restructuring demanded by SCLC.  At the outset of the Poor People’s Campaign, 
Johnson told the press of his expectation that Congress would give “due consideration” to 
SCLC’s demands, but he added that “then we expect to get on running the Government as it 
should be run.”
   
236
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After his contentious meeting with Nixon in the midst of the Charleston strike in 1969, 
Abernathy never received another audience with the president. 
      Although Abernathy faced the nearly impossible task of building on King’s legacy and 
ushering SCLC and the black freedom struggle into a new era with more monumental gains than 
the preceding decade, he made several mistakes that compounded this daunting challenge.  After 
stripping Jesse Jackson of his city manager post at Resurrection City and reassigning him to 
Chicago, Abernathy should have realized that the organization needed to monitor the brash 
preacher closely.  Instead, Jackson directed Operation Breadbasket with relatively little oversight 
from SCLC’s national headquarters in Atlanta, which resulted in Jackson seizing control over 
Black Expo and robbing the organization of a potentially valuable source of funds.  In addition, 
after years as the leader of SCLC’s Chicago affiliate, Jackson successfully usurped the 
organization’s support within the city’s black community when he bolted to form PUSH in 1972.  
Likewise, Abernathy made the ill-advised decision to engage in a public dispute over donors and 
fundraising with Coretta Scott King when she created the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for 
Nonviolent Social Change.  Although King’s widow turned down Abernathy’s offer of a job and 
an office at SCLC following her husband’s death, finding common ground on social issues and 
engaging in collaborative efforts to raise funds might have benefited both organizations in the 
1970s.   
      Yet the fact that other prominent national civil rights organizations struggled to raise funds 
and launch campaigns that resonated with the American public and produced meaningful social 
and political change during the 1970s suggests that SCLC’s decline occurred as a result of 
numerous factors in addition to Abernathy’s leadership deficiencies.  When Abernathy 
announced his resignation in 1973, Vernon Jarrett asserted that King emerged as the central 
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figure in a series of grassroots campaigns “which the media and a celebrity-hungry public 
converted into a one-man movement.”237  Yet even King failed to build off the successes of the 
mid-1960s, which culminated with the Selma-to-Montgomery march three years before his 
death.  For close to a decade after his predecessor’s untimely death, Abernathy fought to advance 
the cause that King gave his life for.  In the end, the obstacles proved insurmountable for King’s 
“alter ego.”238
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